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I. Introduction 
Imagine you are at the Supreme Court of the United States. 
You walk the famed marble steps, and enter under the motto 
“Equal Justice Under Law.”1 You are at the Court to watch oral 
arguments, and are ushered into the gallery. You are captivated 
by the breathtaking grandeur of the ornate courtroom.2 You rise as 
the Justices enter and the Marshal announces “God save the 
United States, and this Honorable Court.”3  
Now imagine you are at a local board of commissioners 
meeting. Rather than just attending as a spectator, you have come 
to request a zoning variance for an addition to your house or to ask 
for a traffic light to be put up in your neighborhood.4 You stand in 
a conference room in your county’s administrative building, 
                                                                                                     
 1. See The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 
2019) (recounting that this motto “express[es] the ultimate responsibility of the 
Supreme Court of the United States”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 2. See Photographs, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
about/photos.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (providing photographs of the 
exterior and inside of the United States Supreme Court building) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See The Court and Its Procedures, SUP. CT. U.S., 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/procedures.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) 
(specifying that this exact statement is said every morning before oral arguments 
before the Supreme Court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Michael I. Meyerson, The Original Meaning of “God”: Using the Language 
of the Framing Generation to Create a Coherent Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1035, 1042–43 (2015) (referring to the earliest 
record of this proclamation in a book from 1857 about a hearing in 1827). 
 4. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 630–31 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (posing a hypothetical of the potential implications of legislative 
prayer at the local government level). 
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surrounded by industrial carpeting and community members 
milling about. When the board enters the room, they stand facing 
you just a few feet away.5 The chairman of the board asks for 
everyone to stand and bow their heads in prayer. Everyone in the 
room rises from their plastic chairs as the chairman begins to say 
“Holy Spirit, open our hearts to Christ’s teachings, and enable us 
to spread His message amongst the people we know and love 
through the applying of the sacred words in everyday lives. In 
Jesus’ name I pray. Amen.”6 As soon as the prayer concludes, the 
chair asks for public comments. Is the proclamation by the 
Marshal considered to be an establishment of religion by the 
government? Is the prayer by the chairman? Where does the line 
fall between what is constitutional, and what is not? Supreme 
Court has previously ruled on the issue of legislative prayer7 in 
only two cases—Marsh v. Chambers8 in 1983 and Town of Greece 
v. Galloway9 in 2014—and in both cases, the Court found the 
                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., County of Jackson, May 24, 2016 Jackson County Board of 
Commissioners Meeting, YOUTUBE (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V-dOx_W9-yw (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) 
(providing a video of a meeting of the Jackson County, Michigan Board of 
Commissioners that shows the meeting settings and the proximity of the 
commissioners to the audience) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Josh Bergeron, Rowan County Commissioners’ Prayer Practice Again 
Ruled Unconstitutional, SALISBURY POST (July 14, 2017, 10:02 AM), 
http://www.salisburypost.com/2017/07/14/county-commissioners-prayer-
practices-again-ruled-unconstitutional/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (providing a 
photograph of the Rowan County, North Carolina Board of Commissioners 
praying at a meeting that shows the meeting room and the close proximity 
between the commissioners and audience members) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 6. See Lund v. Rowan County, No. 1:13CV207, 2013 WL 12137142, at *2 
(M.D.N.C. July 23, 2013) (listing examples of prayers given by the Rowan County 
Board of Commissioners, including this one from March 7, 2011), rev’d and 
remanded, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), on reh’g en 
banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 7. The term “legislative prayer” denotes “[t]he practice of opening 
governmental sessions with prayer.” See Kenneth A. Klukowski, In Whose Name 
We Pray: Fixing the Establishment Clause Train Wreck Involving Legislative 
Prayer, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 221 (2008) (outlining the rise of the 
controversy surrounding legislative prayer). 
 8. See 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (“We granted certiorari limited to the 
challenge to the practice of opening sessions with prayers by a State-employed 
clergyman . . . .”). 
 9. See 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 (2014) (“The Court must decide whether the 
town of Greece, New York, imposes an impermissible establishment of religion by 
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challenged practices to be constitutional.10 However, in both 
instances the Court cautioned that legislative prayer practices are 
not always permissible and that courts must engage in a 
“fact-sensitive” inquiry “that considers both the setting in which 
the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”11 The 
Supreme Court has refused to set forth a clear test for evaluating 
the constitutionality of legislative prayer;12 and as a result of this 
lack of clear doctrinal guidance,13 a circuit split has arisen.14  
On July 14, 2017, in Lund v. Rowan County,15 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a county 
board’s practice of opening its meetings with prayer was 
unconstitutional.16 In so holding, the court relied on four factors 
which, taken together, created an impermissible prayer practice.17 
                                                                                                     
opening its monthly board meetings with a prayer.”). 
 10. See id. at 570 (concluding that “no violation of the Constitution has been 
shown”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793–95 (deciding that the Nebraska Legislature’s 
prayer practice was valid). 
 11. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587. 
 12. See id. at 577 (“Marsh stands for the proposition that it is not necessary 
to define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows 
that the specific practice is permitted.”). 
 13. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(“Marsh and Town of Greece do not settle whether Rowan County’s prayer practice 
is constitutional.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 14. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 509 n.5 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (“We recognize our view regarding Jackson County’s invocation practice 
is in conflict with the Fourth Circuit’s recent en banc decision.” (citing Lund v. 
Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017))), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018); 
Nicholas J. Hunt, Let Us Pray: The Case for Legislator-Led Prayer, 54 TULSA L. 
REV. 49, 76 (2018) (“The courts in Bormuth and Lund caused a jurisprudential 
‘split’ regarding sectarian, legislator-led prayer.” (citing David L. Hudson Jr., 
Circuit Split on Constitutionality of Legislator-Led Prayer May Lead to SCOTUS 
Review, ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
circuit_split_on_legislator_led_prayer (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 15. 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 
(2018). 
 16. See id. at 272 (observing that “[t]he prayer practice served to identify the 
government with Christianity and risked conveying to citizens of minority faiths 
a message of exclusion”). 
 17. See id. at 281 (articulating that “it is the combination of these elements—
not any particular feature alone—that ‘threatens to blur the line between church 
and state to a degree unimaginable in Town of Greece’” (quoting Lund v. Rowan 
County, 837 F.3d 407, 435 (4th Cir.), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016) (Wilkinson, J., 
dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, 670 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g 
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The four factors were (1) the role of the commissioners as the 
exclusive prayer-givers; (2) their invocation of a single faith; 
(3) their instructions to the audience; and (4) the local government 
setting of the prayers.18 Two months later, on September 6, 2017, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson,19 found that a prayer practice that 
exhibited the same four factors was constitutional.20 This split is 
important because it reveals that, a mere three years after the 
Supreme Court last addressed this issue,21 there is still significant 
confusion among the courts concerning how to evaluate the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer practices.22 
This Note will address whether, and to what extent, the four 
factors proposed by the Fourth Circuit, and subsequently rejected 
by the Sixth Circuit, are an appropriate test of the constitutionality 
of a legislative prayer practice under United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Part II explores the background of the 
Establishment Clause23 and legislative prayer.24 The Supreme 
Court has placed significant emphasis on the history of legislative 
prayer in evaluating modern prayer practices, as seen in its two 
cases Marsh v. Chambers25 and Town of Greece v. Galloway.26 Part 
                                                                                                     
en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018))).   
 18. See id. (explaining that the court would “examine each of these features 
in turn”). 
 19. 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 
(2018). 
 20. See id. at 498 (holding that the County’s prayer practice was consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s legislative prayer jurisprudence).  
 21. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 565, 570 (2014) 
(addressing legislative prayer for the first time since 1983). 
 22. See Krista M. Pikus, Hopeful Clarity or Hopeless Disarray?: An 
Examination of Town of Greece v. Galloway and the Establishment Clause, 65 
CATH. U. L. REV. 387, 404–05 (2015) (critiquing Town of Greece for its lack of 
clarity and consistency); Nicholas C. Roberts, The Rising None: Marsh, Galloway, 
and the End of Legislative Prayer, 90 IND. L.J. 407, 415–16 (2015) (articulating 
the continuing questions lower courts face following Town of Greece). 
 23. See infra Part II.A (explaining the Establishment Clause as the cause of 
action for legislative prayer challenges and discussing the Court’s interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause as a whole). 
 24. See infra Part II.B (mapping the early history of legislative prayer in the 
United States and how the Supreme Court has interpreted this history). 
 25. See infra Part II.C.1 (explaining the facts underlying Marsh v. Chambers 
and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in finding the prayer practice constitutional). 
 26. See infra Part II.C.2 (detailing the Supreme Court’s second and most 
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III examines the first two circuit court decisions to consider 
challenges to local legislative prayer in the wake of Town of 
Greece.27 Though factually identical, the Fourth Circuit in Lund28 
and the Sixth Circuit in Bormuth29 arrived at opposite holdings 
concerning the constitutionality of the contested prayer practices.30 
Part IV assesses each of the Lund four factors, comparing the 
Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in favor of these factors with the Sixth 
Circuit’s explanation for why they are an inaccurate measure 
under the Supreme Court’s guidance.31 In considering both the 
constitutionality and applicability of these four factors in 
legislative prayer challenges, this Note ultimately concludes that 
until the Supreme Court articulates a clearer test, these factors 
provide a valuable tool for lower courts.32  
II. Overview of the Establishment Clause and Prior Jurisprudence 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the 
United States Constitution governs challenges to legislative 
prayer practices.33 Courts consider these prayers to be government 
                                                                                                     
recent legislative prayer case, Town of Greece v. Galloway, in 2014). 
 27. See infra Part III (outlining the differences between the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuit decisions). 
 28. See infra Part III.A (exploring the facts and procedural history that gave 
rise to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lund v. Rowan County, and the court’s 
reasoning for finding the prayer practice unconstitutional). 
 29. See infra Part III.B (summarizing the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson and the surrounding facts and procedural history). 
 30. See infra notes 129–38 and accompanying text (examining the points of 
digression between the Fourth and Sixth Circuits). 
 31. See infra Part IV (analyzing the four factors of the commissioners as the 
sole prayer-givers; the exclusive reference to one faith, and the advancement of 
that faith; the invitations for meeting attendees to participate in the prayers; and 
the local government setting). 
 32. See infra Part V (explaining the role of the Lund factors in the current 
judicial context). 
 33. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 288 
(4th Cir. 2005) (establishing that legislative prayer is “subject only to the 
proscriptions of the Establishment Clause” (internal citation omitted)); Coleman 
v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 891 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) (“[L]egislative 
prayer cases . . . are subject to analysis only under the Establishment Clause of 
the First Amendment, and not under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”); Atheists of Fla., Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 779 
F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he proper analytical 
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speech.34 Such government speech is not subject to the same 
restrictions as private speech,35 and “[c]ourts have thus declined to 
entertain legislative prayer challenges cast under the Free Speech, 
Free Exercise, and Equal Protection Clauses.”36 However, 
government speech must conform with the Establishment 
Clause.37 Aside from legislative prayer, the Establishment Clause 
has been applied to challenges to religion in schools,38 government 
                                                                                                     
device in this [legislative prayer] case is the Establishment Clause, and not the 
Equal Protection or Free Speech clauses”). 
 34. See Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 
2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation) (articulating that a city 
council’s legislative prayer practice constituted government speech rather than 
private speech); Simpson, 404 F.3d at 288 (concluding that legislative prayer is 
government speech); Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 251 
F. Supp. 3d 772, 792 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (rejecting plaintiffs’ contention that “case 
law construing legislative prayer as government speech either predates Town of 
Greece or fails to account for it”); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (“These invocations are authorized by a government policy 
and take place on government property at government-sponsored . . . events.”). 
 35. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009) 
(recapping numerous cases establishing the ways in which the government may 
express its views (citing Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 
(2005); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 
(2000); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in judgment); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991); Columbia Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., 
concurring))). 
 36. Fields, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 791 (citing Simpson, 404 F.3d at 287–88; 
Coleman, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 890–91; Atheists of Fla., 779 F. Supp.2d at 1341–42).  
 37. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) 
(“[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment Clause.”); see also 
id. at 468–69 (recognizing the various restrains on government speech); Bruce 
Ledewitz, Could Government Speech Endorsing a Higher Law Resolve the 
Establishment Clause Crisis?, 41 ST. MARY’S L.J. 41, 42–43 (2009) (“Without 
specifying the relationship to the Establishment Clause, the Court used the 
government speech doctrine to decide Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, a 
Ten Commandments case, suggesting the doctrine’s utility in this field.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 38. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301 (student-led prayers at football games); 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (prayers at public school graduations); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580–81 (1987) (creation science in public 
schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (prayers in public schools); 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40–41 (1980) (posting of the Ten Commandments 
in public schoolrooms); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 
(1963) (Bible reading in schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) 
(prayers in public schools). 
404 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019) 
aid to religious institutions,39 and governmental religious 
displays.40 
A. Establishment Clause Interpretation 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”41 The Supreme Court has continually stated 
that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that 
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.”42 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Lund, “[t]he great 
                                                                                                     
 39. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–44 (2002) (school 
vouchers and religious schools); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 822–23 (1995) (university funding to student religious publication); 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act benefits for religious school students); Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 666–67 (1970) (tax exemptions for religious 
organizations). 
 40. See McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850–
51 (2005) (Ten Commandments display in courthouses); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (Ten Commandments display on state capitol grounds); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670–71 (1984) (government Nativity scene). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has interpreted the word 
“Congress” in the First Amendment to apply to the entire federal government, not 
just the legislative branch. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429–30 (1962) 
(explaining the meaning of the First Amendment in terms of restraining the 
federal government rather than just Congress). The First Amendment has also 
been applied to the states through incorporation. See infra notes 46–49 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s incorporation jurisprudence). 
See also Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: 
Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 371 (2011) 
In First Amendment doctrine, narrow parsing of the words of the Amendment has 
not determined its reach. By its terms, the Amendment binds only Congress. Yet 
the First Amendment applies to actions of the federal executive and judiciary, 
and the First Amendment constrains the states not by virtue of its text, but 
because of incorporation through the due process clause. 
 42. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). The Supreme Court has 
frequently quoted the language from Larson v. Valente in subsequent 
Establishment Clause decisions. E.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 
(2018); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 619 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 719 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bd. of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)); see also McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (“[T]he First Amendment 
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between 
religion and nonreligion.” (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 (1985); 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewig 
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promise of the Establishment Clause is that religion will not 
operate as an instrument of division in our nation.”43 Although the 
clause was ratified in 1791,44 the Supreme Court had little 
opportunity to interpret the Establishment Clause prior to the 
mid-twentieth century.45 Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing 
Township46 in 1947 applied the Establishment Clause to the states 
through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment47 and 
marked the beginning of the Supreme Court’s modern era of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.48 Since Everson, the Court 
                                                                                                     
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 43. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(“[T]here is a time-honored tradition of legislative prayer that reflects the respect 
of each faith for other faiths and the aspiration, common to so many creeds, of 
finding higher meaning and deeper purpose in these fleeting moments each of us 
spends upon this earth.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018).  
 44. See The Bill of Rights: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript (last updated 
Sept. 24, 2018) (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (explaining that Congress proposed the 
amendment on September 25, 1789, and it was ratified by three-fourths of the 
state legislatures on December 15, 1791) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 45. See David W. Cook, The Un-Established Establishment Clause: A 
Circumstantial Approach to Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 71, 76–77 (2004) (positing that, before this time, “few people 
were bothered by prayers and the teachings of Christian beliefs”); Mark C. 
Rahdert, Court Reform and Breathing Space Under the Establishment Clause, 87 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835, 842 (2012) (“Before Everson, Supreme Court decisions on 
the establishment of religion were exceedingly rare.”). 
 46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 47. See id. at 14–15. 
The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the 
light of its history and the evils it was designed forever to suppress, 
have been several times elaborated by the decisions of this Court prior 
to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the 
Fourteenth. 
 48. See Aaron Cain, Faith-Based Initiative Proponents Beware: The Key in 
Zelman is Not Just Neutrality, but Private Choice, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 979, 991 (2004) 
(“Scholars widely regard the Supreme Court’s Everson v. Board of Education 
decision in 1947 as the beginning of modern Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation 
of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 680 (2002) (arguing that “[w]hen 
in 1947 the Court turned its attention to the Establishment Clause, it acted as if 
it had a blank slate upon which to write”); Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and 
Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1009, 1017 (2011) (explaining that Everson “ushered in the modern era of 
406 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019) 
has frequently grappled with the application of the Establishment 
Clause to government actions.49  
The first clear Establishment Clause analysis50 was the so 
called “Lemon test,” developed by Chief Justice Warren Burger in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman51 in 1971. This test focused on “the three main 
evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to 
afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”52 The test 
asked (1) whether the government act had a secular, legislative 
purpose; (2) whether the primary effect either advanced or 
inhibited religion; and (3) whether the action fostered government 
entanglement with religion.53 The Lemon test has arguably 
                                                                                                     
Establishment Clause jurisprudence”); Lisa Shaw Roy, History, Transparency, 
and the Establishment Clause: A Proposal for Reform, 112 PA. ST. L. REV. 683, 693 
(2008) (discussing the Everson decision and its significance in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause cases). 
 49. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” the Supreme 
Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 496–97 (1986) (“It is . . . no wonder 
that establishment jurisprudence has been universally criticized. The Court itself 
has acknowledged its own ‘considerable internal inconsistency,’ candidly 
admitting that it has ‘sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility.’” (citing 
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668; Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 
U.S. 646, 662 (1980))); see also Jay Alan Sekulow, James Matthew Henderson, 
Sr., & Kevin E. Broyles, Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: 
Equality as a Guiding Principle in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 351, 354–57 (1995) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s history 
of applying the Establishment Clause to governmental religious activity).  
 50. See Marcia S. Alembik, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter 
Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1176–77 
(2006) (reviewing the history of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
from Everson to Lemon); Roxanne L. Houtman, A.C.L.U. v. McCreary County: 
Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 395, 400 
(2005) (exploring the significance of the Lemon test); see also John M. Bickers, 
False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Cases 
Fuel Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 308 (2018) (“There was likely hope 
that the Lemon formation would serve as a Grand Unified Theory of the 
Establishment Clause, but that was not to be.”). 
 51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 52. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970)); see also Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: 
Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 915–17 (1987) 
(exploring a more practical test for Establishment Clause constitutionality based 
on these “three main evils”). 
 53. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (“Every analysis in this area must begin 
with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.”). 
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remained the most prevalent Establishment Clause test;54 
however, it has also garnered significant opposition from Supreme 
Court Justices55 and scholars alike.56  
                                                                                                     
 54. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging that the Lemon test is “the only coherent test a majority of the 
Court has ever adopted”); Allison Hugi, A Borderline Case: The Establishment 
Clause Implications of Religious Questioning by Government Officials, 85 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 193, 198 (2018) (“The Lemon test is generally considered the guiding, if 
flickering, light in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 55. See, e.g., McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 
844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (highlighting that over the years a majority 
of the Justices had “repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon test’” (citations omitted)); 
County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 
492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (“I am content for present purposes to remain within the 
Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, 
that test as our primary guide in this difficult area.”), abrogated by Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that this action once again illustrates 
certain difficulties inherent in the Court’s use of the test articulated in Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.” (internal citations omitted)); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing 
his disapproval of “continuing with the sisyphean task of trying to patch together 
the blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier described in Lemon v. Kurtzman” 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Justice Antonin Scalia, a 
particularly outspoken critic of the Lemon test, once famously wrote that 
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in 
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, 
Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, 
frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches 
Union Free School District. . . . Over the years, however, no fewer than 
five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, 
personally driven pencils through the creature’s heart (the author of 
today’s opinion repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (internal citations omitted). 
 56. See, e.g., Emily D. Newhouse, I Pledge Allegiance to the Flag of the United 
States of America: One Nation Under No God, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 383, 394–95 
(2004) (quoting one commentator who stated that “[t]he literal language of Lemon 
has remained intact but the meaning attached to each of the three test questions 
has fluctuated depending on which Justice wrote the Court’s decision” (quoting 
Timothy V. Franklin, Commentary, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 
72 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (1992))); Karthik Ravishankar, The Establishment Clause’s 
Hydra: The Lemon Test in the Circuit Courts, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 261, 262–63 
nn.7–8 (2016) (citing numerous examples of scholarly criticism of the Lemon test); 
see also Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to 
Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 
408 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019) 
In light of the criticisms surrounding Lemon, Justices have 
proposed other approaches to the Establishment Clause.57 Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s endorsement test first questions, “whether 
a reasonable person would believe that the government is, through 
its conduct or expression, endorsing religion.”58 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing in Lee v. Weisman,59 highlighted the need for 
actual coercion before government crosses a line, stating that 
government may not “coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”60 Out of the often-confusing jurisprudence 
                                                                                                     
34 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 267 (1999) (“Rumors of Lemon’s death have been, in Mark 
Twain’s words, ‘greatly exaggerated.’” (quoting Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the 
Juice from Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. 
KY. L. REV. 621, 633 (1995))). 
 57. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The Lemon 
Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. 
L.J. 351, 358 (2010) (“Unsatisfied with the Lemon test, Justices O’Connor and 
Kennedy have proposed alternative tests that require a showing of ‘endorsement’ 
or ‘coercion’ of religion to constitute a violation of the First Amendment.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 58. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable 
Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1557 (2010) (synthesizing the various 
iterations of the endorsement test). Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test was first 
proposed in her 1984 concurrence to Lynch v. Donnelly. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (exploring two ways the 
government can run afoul of the Establishment Clause, and “[t]he second and 
more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion”). 
 59. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 60. See id. at 577 (explaining that this test exemplifies the “fundamental 
limitations” of the Establishment Clause). 
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on this issue,61 the Court has created an exception to all of these 
tests when it comes to legislative prayer.62  
B. History of Legislative Prayer Under the Establishment Clause 
Legislative prayer is a widespread practice at every level of 
government across the country, dating back to the founding of the 
United States.63 The Supreme Court has relied heavily on the 
historical practice of legislative prayer in the United States as a 
key reason for its constitutionality.64 In 1774, the Continental 
Congress adopted the practice of beginning sessions with prayers 
given by a paid chaplain.65 The First Congress formalized this 
                                                                                                     
 61. Even Supreme Court Justices have commented on the inconsistent and 
confusing interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In one 1985 dissent Justice 
William Rehnquist lamented that 
[I]n the 38 years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have 
been neither principled nor unified. Our recent opinions, many of them 
hopelessly divided pluralities, have with embarrassing candor 
conceded that the “wall of separation” is merely a “blurred, indistinct, 
and variable barrier,” which “is not wholly accurate” and can only be 
“dimly perceived.” 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 
614; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1971); Wolman v. Walter, 433 
U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673). Justice Clarence Thomas has 
complained that “our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless 
disarray.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 62. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575 (2014) (“Marsh is 
sometimes described as ‘carving out an exception’ to the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, because it sustained legislative prayer without subjecting 
the practice to ‘any of the formal “tests” that have traditionally structured’ this 
inquiry.” (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796, 813 (1983) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting)). 
 63. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that legislative prayer has been practiced and upheld by the Supreme 
Court at the federal, state, and local levels of government (citing Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983))); Scott W. Gaylord, When the Exception 
Becomes the Rule: Marsh and Sectarian Legislative Prayer Post-Summum, 79 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (2011) (describing the widespread nature of legislative 
prayer). 
 64. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (“In light of the 
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt 
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of 
the fabric of our society.”). 
 65. Id. at 787. 
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practice in 1789 by adopting a policy resolving that each house of 
Congress would appoint a chaplain, which the Senate did on April 
25, 1789, and the House on May 1, 1789.66 On September 22, 1789, 
Congress passed a statute clarifying various aspects of the 
chaplaincies, including salaries.67 Three days after Congress 
authorized paid chaplains, the language of the Bill of Rights was 
finalized.68 Later, Chief Justice Burger would cite this fact as an 
endorsement of legislative prayer by the Founding Fathers.69 He 
noted that because Congress passed the chaplaincy legislation and 
approved the First Amendment language in the same week, “[i]t 
can hardly be thought that . . . they intended the Establishment 
Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared 
acceptable.”70 
The practice of opening each day of Congress with prayer has 
endured since 1789.71 While there has been criticism over the lack 
of diversity in the appointed congressional chaplains,72 both the 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171, 1184 (2009) [hereinafter Congressional Chaplaincies] 
(recounting that the First Congress resolved that the two chaplains would be of 
different denominations and that the chaplains would alternate between the two 
houses regularly). 
 67. See id. (clarifying that the legislation set forth the salaries of numerous 
congressional officials, not just the chaplains). 
 68. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First 
Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains and opening 
prayers as a violation of that Amendment . . . .”). 
 69. See id. at 790 (“[H]istorical evidence sheds light not only on what the 
draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they 
thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First 
Congress— their actions reveal their intent.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Chaplains of the House, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Chaplains/ (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2019) (detailing the continued tradition of congressional prayer by the 
House Chaplain) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Chaplain’s 
Prayer, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/ 
Traditions/Chaplains_Prayer.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (describing the 
Senate’s “enduring tradition [of] the chaplain’s daily prayer”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 72. See Congressional Chaplaincies, supra note 66, at 1203 (commenting 
that the positions have been largely held by Caucasian, Protestant men); 
Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious 
Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1025 (2010) [hereinafter Secret Costs] 
(“When it comes to getting a job as a congressional chaplain, a Jewish rabbi 
almost assuredly does not stand on equal ground with comparably credentialed 
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House and the Senate have invited visiting ministers of a variety 
of faiths to serve as guest chaplains.73 For example, both houses of 
Congress have hosted Muslim,74 Hindu,75 and Native American76 
guest chaplains, as well as women77 and African Americans.78 
C. Prior Supreme Court Cases Concerning Legislative Prayer 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of legislative 
prayer under the Establishment Clause in only two cases:79 Marsh 
v. Chambers in 198380 and Town of Greece v. Galloway in 2014.81 
These cases provide the “doctrinal starting point” for courts 
                                                                                                     
mainline Protestant ministers. After all, we have had hundreds of Protestant 
chaplains and no Jewish ones.”). 
 73. See Congressional Chaplaincies, supra note 66, at 1204 n.169 (indicating 
that it is unclear when the House and Senate established these guest chaplaincy 
programs, however there are records showing that the practice dates back to at 
least 1960); see also Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Representatives, 327 
F. Supp. 3d 748, 757 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (citing one expert witness for the proposition 
that “[g]uest chaplains did not exist at the federal level until 1855”). 
 74. See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, The Muslim Invocation on Capitol Hill: 
Revisiting the Legality of Prayer in Congress, 3 J. ISLAMIC L. 197, 197 (1998) 
(stating that Imam Siraj Wahaj of New York became the first Muslim guest 
minister for the House of Representatives on June 25, 1991, followed by Imam W. 
Deen Mohammed in the Senate on February 6, 1992). 
 75. See Congressional Chaplaincies, supra note 66, at 1205–06 (elaborating 
on the controversies and protests surrounding Venkatachalapathi Samuldrala, 
the first Hindu guest chaplain to the House in 2000, and Rajan Zed, the first 
Hindu guest chaplain to the Senate in 2007). 
 76. See 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789–1989: ADDRESSES ON THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 304 (Wendy Wolff ed., 1991) (detailing 
various Senate guest chaplains, including the first American Indian who was an 
“eighty-three-year-old Sioux who brought his peace pipe”).  
 77. See Wilmina Rowland Smith, 91, Guest Chaplain in Senate, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/14/us/wilmina-rowland-smith-
91-guest-chaplain-in-senate.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (recounting that in 
1971 Wilmina Rowland Smith became the first woman to serve as guest chaplain 
of the Senate) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. See Congressional Chaplaincies, supra note 66, at 1202 (discussing Barry 
Black, the Senate’s first African-American chaplain). 
 79. See Williamson v. Brevard County, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1272 (M.D. Fla. 
2017) (acknowledging that in these two cases the Supreme Court departed from 
the traditional Establishment Clause tests, declining to apply tests such as the 
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test). 
 80. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 81. 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
412 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397 (2019) 
considering legislative prayer challenges.82 While numerous 
circuit and district courts decided cases on this topic in the time 
between these two decisions,83 the Fourth and Sixth Circuits were 
the first courts of appeals to do so after Town of Greece.84  
1. Marsh v. Chambers and the Supreme Court’s Initial Approach 
to Legislative Prayer 
The question before the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Chambers 
was whether the Nebraska state legislature’s practice of paying a 
chaplain to open each legislative session with a prayer violated the 
Establishment Clause.85 Rather than applying the traditional 
Lemon test,86 Chief Justice Burger looked to the history of 
                                                                                                     
 82. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. 
Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 896 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(“Marsh and Town of Greece together identify certain characteristics of setting 
and content that mark legislative prayer.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 
2013) (concluding that a city’s policy of opening meetings with privately-led 
prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause); Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653, 
F.3d 341, 355 (4th Cir. 2011) (deciding that a county board of commissioners’ 
practice of using sectarian prayers to open meetings was unconstitutional); 
Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 353 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(O’Connor, J., retired, sitting by designation) (upholding a city council’s policy 
requiring legislative prayers to be nondenominational as constitutional); 
Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2008) (resolving that 
the practice of two county commissions allowing for volunteer leaders to give 
prayers at meetings did not violate the Establishment Clause); Simpson v. 
Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding 
a local government’s legislative prayer policy constitutional, even though it 
required the prayer givers to be of Judeo-Christian or monotheistic religions); 
Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (highlighting the 
fact that a town council’s legislative prayer practice violated the Establishment 
Clause because it favored and advanced one religion over others); Snyder v. 
Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1228 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that a city 
council did not violate the Establishment Clause by denying a citizen from giving 
a prayer at a council meeting based on the content of that prayer). 
 84. See Brief in Opposition at 9, Rowan County v. Lund, No. 17-565 (U.S. 
Dec. 15, 2017), 2017 WL 6508403, at *9 (outlining the circuit split that has arisen 
from the first two appellate decisions to interpret Town of Greece).  
 85. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784–85 (addressing a challenge brought by Ernest 
Chambers, a member of the Nebraska legislature). 
 86. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text (discussing the three-part 
Lemon test for Establishment Clause constitutionality); see also Marsh, 463 U.S. 
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legislative prayer87 and concluded that, on its face, legislative 
prayer did not violate the Constitution.88 In that holding, the 
Supreme Court created a critical exception to its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence and allowed a regularly occurring 
government practice to incorporate religion.89 
The Court also found that the specific practice of the Nebraska 
legislature, when considered against the historical background, 
was not unconstitutional.90 The case concerned the employment of 
Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister who had been paid to 
pray before each legislative session for sixteen years.91 While the 
Court found that nothing in this practice violated the 
Establishment Clause, Chief Justice Burger made it clear that the 
prayer opportunity could not be exploited “to proselytize or 
advance any one, or disparage any other, faith or belief.”92 He also 
stated that in considering such practices, judges should not parse 
                                                                                                     
at 800–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have no doubt that if any group of law 
students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative 
prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.”); 
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2125 (1996) (“Between 1971 and 1984, the Court faithfully 
applied the Lemon test to every Establishment Clause challenge except the 
legislative prayer case of Marsh v. Chambers.”). Interestingly, Chief Justice 
Burger authored the majority opinions for both Lemon v. Kurtzman and Marsh v. 
Chambers. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. 
 87. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792 (“In light of the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society.”). 
 88. See id. (“To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with 
making the laws is not . . . an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward 
establishment . . . .”). 
 89. See, e.g., Anne Abrell, Just a Little Talk with Jesus: Reaching the Limits 
of the Legislative Prayer Exception, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 145, 152 (2007) (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s “special exception to the usual Establishment Clause 
doctrines for legislative prayer” stemming from Marsh v. Chambers); Mary Jean 
Dolan, Government Identity Speech and Religion: Establishment Clause Limits 
After Summum, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 26 (2010) (characterizing the 
legislative prayer exception as the only Supreme Court-sanctioned exception to 
the Establishment Clause). 
 90. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792–93 (rejecting the argument that these three 
factors were unconstitutional: a clergyman of only one denomination had been 
selected for sixteen years; the chaplain was paid at public expense; and the 
prayers were in the Judeo-Christian tradition). 
 91. See id. at 784–85 (elaborating that Palmer had been chosen biennially 
by the Legislature and was paid $319.75 per month out of public funds). 
 92. Id. at 794–95. 
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the contents of a particular prayer,93 a directive that has since 
drawn significant attention and analysis from lower courts.94  
Given Marsh’s focus on tradition as a value in legislative 
prayer analysis, many commentators have questioned whether 
and how the decision should apply to local government prayer 
challenges.95 Because local government prayer may lack the same 
history as federal or state legislative prayer, judges and scholars 
were concerned about Marsh’s usefulness.96 The Court addressed 
these challenges thirty-five years later in Town of Greece.97 
2. The Supreme Court’s Refinement of Marsh in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway 
The Supreme Court was again confronted with the issue of 
legislative prayer in Town of Greece.98 There, plaintiffs challenged 
the practice of the town board of Greece, New York for beginning 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. (“[I]t is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to parse 
the content of a particular prayer.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(observing that “courts need to assure themselves that legislative prayer 
opportunities are not being exploited before they abdicate all constitutional 
scrutiny” of the contents of prayers); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 
1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (reading Marsh as forbidding “judicial scrutiny of the 
content of prayers absent evidence that the legislative prayers have been 
exploited to advance or disparage a religion”). 
 95. See, e.g., Abrell, supra note 89, at 187 (arguing that Marsh should only 
apply to state legislative prayer, not local government prayer); Marc Rohr, Can 
the City Council Praise the Lord? Some Ruminations About Prayers at Local 
Government Meetings, 36 NOVA L. REV. 481, 486–87 (2012) (reviewing lower court 
decisions that considered Marsh’s implications at the local level). 
 96. See Abrell, supra note 89, at 187 (theorizing that because Marsh was 
“based on the specific facts of the prayer practice in the Nebraska legislature, 
including: the unique history of prayer in state legislative bodies; the large size of 
such groups; and the allowance of individuals coming and going throughout the 
session. Local government entities . . . should receive a different analysis.”); Eric 
J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and the 
Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713, 723–28 (2009) (criticizing Marsh’s 
tradition-based standard, musing that “[i]f James Madison and the boys thought 
legislative chaplains were okay, who are we to disagree?”). 
 97. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 565 (2014) (deciding the 
case on May 5, 2014). 
 98. See id. at 569–70 (“The Court must decide whether the town of Greece, 
New York, imposes an impermissible establishment of religion by opening its 
monthly meetings with a prayer.”). 
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each of its meetings with a prayer given by a local clergyman.99 The 
clergymen were solicited from a local directory by a town employee 
and were almost entirely Christian.100 After the plaintiffs 
complained about the overwhelmingly Christian nature of the 
prayers, the board invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of 
the local Baha’i temple to give a prayer, and a Wiccan priestess 
who volunteered was permitted to give a prayer as well.101 
The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the town’s prayer 
practice from that permitted in Marsh in two ways, citing both the 
sectarian nature of the prayers and the local government setting 
of the practice.102 The district court granted the town’s motion for 
summary judgment,103 but the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit reversed this decision.104 Judge Guido 
Calabresi, writing for the Second Circuit, referenced the town’s 
prayer-giver selection process, the prayer contents, and the context 
of the prayer practice, concluding that “the town’s prayer practice 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. at 570–72 (specifying that both plaintiffs had attended town 
meetings and objected to the pervasively Christian prayers). 
 100. See id. at 571 (detailing how nearly all of the congregations in the town 
of Greece were Christian); see also Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 
(2d Cir. 2012) (indicating that between 1999 and 2007, every prayer giver was 
Christian), rev’d, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 101. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 572 (determining that the town only 
invited these non-Christian prayer givers following complaints from the 
plaintiffs); see also Galloway, 681 F.3d at 23 (asserting that in 2008, after the 
plaintiffs complained, non-Christians gave four out of the twelve prayers at town 
board meetings). 
 102. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577–78 (“Respondents assert that the 
town’s prayer exercise falls outside that tradition [discussed in Marsh] and 
transgresses the Establishment Clause for two independent but mutually 
reinforcing reasons.”).  
 103. See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 732 F. Supp. 2d 195, 243 (W.D.N.Y. 
2010) (“[I]n light of the undisputed facts of this case, the Court finds as a matter 
of law that the Town did not violate the Establishment Clause.”), rev’d, 681 F.3d 
20 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 104. See Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34 (“What we do hold is that a legislative 
prayer practice that, however well-intentioned, conveys to a reasonable objective 
observer under the totality of the circumstances an official affiliation with a 
particular religion violates the clear command of the Establishment Clause.”); see 
also id. (finding a constitutional violation “[w]here the overwhelming 
predominance of prayers offered are associated, often in an explicitly sectarian 
way, with a particular creed, and where the town . . . conveys the impression that 
town officials themselves identify with the sectarian prayers and that residents 
in attendance are expected to participate in them”). 
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must be viewed as an endorsement of a particular religious 
viewpoint.”105 Judge Calabresi was careful to reaffirm the need for 
context-based analysis, noting the “delicate balancing act” of 
Establishment Clause claims.106 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit 
and ruled that legislative prayers need not be nonsectarian in 
order to be constitutional107 and that the town’s prayer practice 
was permissible.108 Regarding the sectarian nature of the prayers, 
the Court again looked to the tradition of legislative prayer in the 
United States.109 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
                                                                                                     
 105. See id. at 30 (emphasizing that the court did “not rely on any single 
aspect of the town’s prayer practice, but rather on the totality of the 
circumstances present in this case”). 
 106. See id. at 33 (clarifying that courts should undertake a careful 
consideration of the facts, rather than relying on governmental claims of religious 
neutrality). Judge Calabresi also clarified the court’s holding by stating: 
People with the best of intentions may be tempted, in the course of 
giving a legislative prayer, to convey their views of religious truth, and 
thereby run the risk of making others feel like outsiders. Even if all 
prayer-givers could resist this temptation, municipalities with the best 
of motives may still have trouble preventing the appearance of 
religious affiliation. Ours is a society splintered, and joined, by a wide 
constellation of religious beliefs and non-beliefs. Amidst these many 
viewpoints, even a single circumstance may appear to suggest an 
affiliation. To the extent that the state cannot make demands 
regarding the content of legislative prayers, moreover, municipalities 
have few means to forestall the prayer-giver who cannot resist the urge 
to proselytize. These difficulties may well prompt municipalities to 
pause and think carefully before adopting legislative prayer, but they 
are not grounds on which to preclude its practice.  
Id. at 34. 
 107. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 582 (contending that “[o]nce [the 
government] invites prayer into the public sphere, government must permit a 
prayer giver to address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates, 
unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to be nonsectarian”). 
 108. See id. at 584 (“The prayers delivered in the town of Greece do not fall 
outside the tradition this Court has recognized.”). 
 109. See id. at 578 (“An insistence on nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer as a 
single, fixed standard is not consistent with the tradition of legislative prayer 
outlined in the Court’s cases.”). Additionally, the majority in Town of Greece does 
not even mention the Lemon test, cementing Marsh’s rejection of the test for 
legislative prayer challenges. See id. at 569–92 (failing to discuss or cite Lemon v. 
Kurtzman in the majority opinion); supra notes 86–88 (discussing the Court’s 
rejection of the Lemon test in Marsh); see also Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 
903 F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2018) (Newsom, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that “the [Town of Greece] Court never so much as mentioned Lemon” in 
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referenced the explicit religious themes of early prayers given by 
congressional chaplains110 as evidence that legislative prayer can 
“coexist with the principles of disestablishment and religious 
freedom.”111 Furthermore, Marsh had not based the 
constitutionality of the prayer practice there on the neutrality of 
its content; rather, requiring prayers to be nonsectarian would 
compel legislators to supervise and censor the content of religious 
speech.112 Justice Kennedy also stated that a town is not required 
to search beyond its borders in order to ensure diversity in 
religious viewpoints.113 
Additionally, Town of Greece held that the local government’s 
role in arranging the prayer schedule did not, by itself, invalidate 
the practice of legislative prayer.114 The question of 
constitutionality was a “fact-sensitive one” that must consider 
“both the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to 
whom it is directed.”115 Justice Kennedy invoked Justice 
O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” standard,116 according to which 
a practice is considered from the perspective of a reasonable 
observer who is aware of the tradition in question and understands 
                                                                                                     
holding that the prayer practice was constitutional). The only reference to Lemon 
in Town of Greece appeared in Justice Breyer’s dissent. See Town of Greece, 572 
U.S. at 614–15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The question in this case is whether the 
prayer practice . . . , by doing too little to reflect the religious diversity of its 
citizens, did too much . . . to promote the ‘political division along religious lines’ 
that ‘was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was 
intended to protect.’” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)). 
 110. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 579 (“The decidedly Christian nature of 
these prayers must not be dismissed as the relic of a time when our Nation was 
less pluralistic than it is today.”). 
 111. Id. at 578 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983)). 
 112. See id. at 581 (maintaining that requiring nonsectarian prayers “would 
involve government in religious matters to a far greater degree than is the case 
under the town’s current practice of neither editing or approving prayers in 
advance nor criticizing their content after the fact”). 
 113. See id. at 585–86 (“So long as the town maintains a policy of 
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its 
borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious 
balancing.”). 
 114. See id. at 586 (evaluating the plaintiffs’ argument that the local 
government setting necessarily coerced nonadherents into participating). 
 115. Id. at 587. 
 116. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (explaining Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test for Establishment Clause constitutionality). 
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the purpose of the practice.117 The audience for the challenged 
prayers was the legislators themselves, rather than the public, and 
the “internal act” was constitutional.118 Notably, Justice Kennedy 
warned that “[t]he analysis would be different if town board 
members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled 
out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions 
might be influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer 
opportunity.”119 To assess violations of his own coercion test,120 
Justice Kennedy asserted that courts should consider the “pattern 
and practice” of prayer over time, rather than isolated events of 
offense.121 In reviewing the record, there was no evidence that the 
prayers “chastised dissenters” or “attempted lengthy disquisition 
on religious dogma.”122 The Court concluded that the pattern in 
Town of Greece aligned with the tradition of legislative prayer; 
there was no evidence of coercion for nonadherents; and the prayer 
practice was thus constitutional.123  
Whereas Marsh centered on the tradition of legislative 
prayer,124 Town of Greece focused on the value of inclusivity in 
                                                                                                     
 117. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014) (clarifying that 
the purposes of legislative prayer are “to lend gravity to public proceedings and 
to acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private citizens, not 
to afford government an opportunity to proselytize or force truant constituents 
into the pews” (citing Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 720–21 (2010) (plurality 
opinion); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)). Justice 
O’Connor first proposed the reasonable observer standard in her concurrence to 
Lynch v. Donnelly, which held that, notwithstanding the religious significance of 
the display, a city’s crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause. See 465 U.S. 
668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that the crèche served a 
secular purpose and “[i]t cannot fairly be understood to convey a message of 
government endorsement of religion”). 
 118. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587–88 (explaining that the lawmakers 
were permitted to have a moment of prayer to set their minds to “a higher 
purpose” in order to ease “the task of governing”) (quoting Chambers v. Marsh, 
504 F. Supp. 585, 588 (D. Neb. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 675 F.2d 228 (8th 
Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)). 
 119. Id. at 588. 
 120. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (outlining Justice 
Kennedy’s coercion test). 
 121. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589–90 (warning that speech that is 
disagreeable or offensive to an audience is not inherently coercive). 
 122. See id. (clarifying that offense does not equal coercion in Establishment 
Clause cases). 
 123. Id. at 591–92. 
 124. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Court’s analysis in Marsh v. 
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legislative prayer challenges.125 The dissenters in Town of Greece 
argued that the disputed practice was not inclusive enough,126 
illustrating the importance of this value in the eyes of the Court.127 
While neither Marsh nor Town of Greece set forth an explicit test 
for lower courts to apply to legislative prayer cases, the Court 
began exploring the issues that underlie the constitutionality of 
these practices.128 
III. Recent Circuit Split Concerning Local Legislative Prayer 
A circuit split has arisen recently between the Fourth129 and 
Sixth130 Circuits over the issue of legislative prayer at the local 
government level. While the facts of these cases are remarkably 
                                                                                                     
Chambers). 
 125. See Williamson v. Brevard County, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 
2017) (“The Town of Greece Court upheld an invited-speaker invocation practice 
that resulted in the prayers being given predominantly by Christians, but in 
doing so it repeatedly emphasized the inclusiveness of the town’s practice.”). 
 126. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 611–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing 
to the numerous ways in which the town board could have made the prayer 
practice more inclusive of other faiths and religious minorities); see also id. at 622 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the highly individualized nature of local 
government “calls for Board members to exercise special care to ensure that the 
prayers offered are inclusive—that they respect each and every member of the 
community as an equal citizen”). 
 127. See Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment 
Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87–88 (2014) 
(commenting on the points of agreement in the Town of Greece opinion, 
particularly the shared value of “pluralism and the protection of religious 
minorities” between the majority and the dissents). 
 128. See Recent Case, Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(En Banc), 131 HARV. L. REV. 626, 631 (2017) (“Town of Greece acknowledged it 
could not address every situation, but its instruction for cases outside its bounds 
was simply to conduct a ‘fact-sensitive’ review, while noting that general 
Establishment Clause values are still at play in legislative prayer cases.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 129. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(resolving that the Rowan County Board of Commissioners’ prayer practice was 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 
(2018). 
 130. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498, 514 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (recognizing the court’s disagreement with the Fourth Circuit and 
holding that the Jackson County Board of Commissioners’ legislative prayer 
practice was constitutional), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).  
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similar, the two courts, following a series of appeals131 and 
rehearings,132 came to opposite holdings. This split stems from a 
lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on the application 
of the Establishment Clause to legislative prayer cases.133 In Lund 
v. Rowan County, the Fourth Circuit focused on the differences 
between Rowan County’s prayer practice and the practices 
approved of in Marsh and Town of Greece.134 The court considered 
four factors of the County’s prayer practice: (1) the commissioners 
as the exclusive prayer-givers; (2) the consistent invocation of the 
Christian faith, which sometimes served to advance that religion; 
(3) lawmakers’ invitations for audience members to participate in 
the prayers; and (4) the local government setting.135 The Fourth 
Circuit concluded that these factors rendered the prayer practice 
unconstitutional.136 The same four factors were also present in 
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, but the Sixth Circuit did not find 
that case distinguishable from the practice in Marsh and Town of 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 281 (6th Cir.) 
(considering on appeal the issue of whether the Board of Commissioner’s prayer 
practice was constitutional under the tradition of legislative prayer), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 
494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2708); Lund v. Rowan County, 
837 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir.), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016) (reviewing the district 
court’s decision de novo), reh’g en banc granted, 670 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. 2016), 
and on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 
(2018).    
 132. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 855 F.3d 694, 694–95 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(granting rehearing en banc); Lund v. Rowan County, 670 F. App’x 106, 107 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (same). 
 133. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir.) (“There 
are only two Supreme Court cases that have considered the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer—Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece—and neither one 
provides much instruction beyond establishing that legislative-prayer claims 
occupy a unique place in First Amendment jurisprudence.”), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 
494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).    
 134. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 276 (“Marsh and Town of Greece do not settle 
whether Rowan County’s prayer practice is constitutional. Those decisions did not 
concern lawmaker-led prayer, nor did they involve the other unusual aspects of 
the county’s prayer practice.”).  
 135. See id. at 281 (pointing to the Supreme Court’s prescribed “fact-sensitive 
inquiry” as the basis for examining these four factors). 
 136. See id. (determining that while some of these factors may be permissible, 
when considered “through the lens of the prayer-giver’s identity” they created an 
unconstitutional prayer practice). 
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Greece.137 The Sixth Circuit therefore held that the practice was 
constitutional.138 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Distinguishing of Town of Greece 
On July 14, 2017, in a 10 – 5 decision,139 an en banc panel of the 
Fourth Circuit held that the Rowan County Board of 
Commissioners’ prayer practice “served to identify the government 
with Christianity and risked conveying to citizens of minority 
faiths a message of exclusion” and was therefore 
unconstitutional.140 
The Rowan County Board of Commissioners, the governing 
body of Rowan County, North Carolina, held meetings twice a 
month that were open to the public.141 From at least 2007 until 
2013, when the litigation began, the Board began each of its 
meetings with a prayer given by one of the commissioners.142 No 
one outside of the Board was permitted to give the prayers, and the 
Board members rotated the prayer opportunity among 
themselves.143 The content of the prayers was up to the individual 
commissioners; however, over the five-and-a-half year period 
mentioned in the complaint, the prayers were overwhelmingly and 
explicitly Christian in content, and no other religion was 
represented.144 In addition to referencing only one faith, these 
                                                                                                     
 137. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498, 519 (“In sum, Jackson County’s invocation 
practice is consistent with Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway 
and does not violate the Establishment Clause.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Lund, 863 F.3d at 271. 
 140. See id. at 272 (“We conclude that the Constitution does not allow what 
happened in Rowan County.”). 
 141. See id. (explaining that the Board is comprised of five elected members). 
 142. See Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 714 n.1 (M.D.N.C. 2015) 
(clarifying that the plaintiffs provided the website address for video recordings of 
the board meetings, which were available beginning with the November 5, 2007 
meeting), rev’d and remanded, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 
21, 2016), on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), and aff’d, 863 F.3d 268 
(4th Cir. 2017).  
 143. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(explaining that this practice was “a matter of long-standing custom”), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 144. See id. (reporting that 97% of the prayers in this period “mentioned 
‘Jesus,’ ‘Christ,’ or the ‘Savior,’” and some of the prayers professed the superiority 
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prayers “veered from time to time into overt proselytization,”145 
implying that those who did not practice Christianity were 
spiritually defective.146 Prior to each prayer, the Board would ask 
the audience members to rise and to pray with the 
commissioners.147 The three plaintiffs, all of whom were long-time 
residents of Rowan County who did not identify as Christians,148 
encountered these prayers at Board meetings and felt coerced into 
participating.149 The plaintiffs believed that the prayers conveyed 
the sense that the Board favored Christians, and the plaintiffs 
contended that they therefore felt “excluded from the community 
and the local political process.”150  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece,151 
the district court found that the prayer practice was 
unconstitutional, stating that the “closed-universe of 
prayer-givers” deviated from the permissible tradition of 
legislative prayer.152 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit initially 
                                                                                                     
of the Christian faith or urged listeners to accept Christianity (internal citation 
omitted)); see also id. at 272 (“For years on end, the elected members of the 
county’s Board of Commissioners composed and delivered pointedly sectarian 
invocations.”). 
 145. Id. at 272. 
 146. See id. at 284–85 (providing examples of prayers and noting that many 
characterized Christianity as “the one and only way to salvation” (internal 
citation omitted)).  
 147. See id. at 285 (characterizing the commissioners’ prayers as “portraying 
the failure to love Jesus or follow his teachings as spiritual defects”). 
 148. See id. at 273 (explaining that plaintiff Nancy Lund was a volunteer 
tutor, Liesa Montag-Siegel was a retired middle school librarian, and Robert 
Voelker was interested in education policy and social services). 
 149. Id. at 273–74. 
 150. See id. at 274 (highlighting a particular instance in which one plaintiff 
proposed a nondenominational prayer and feared that his questioning of the 
practice would negatively affect his advocacy on other issues before the Board) 
(citation omitted). This language recalls Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurrence to Lynch v. Donnelly in which she stated that “[e]ndorsement sends 
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community . . . .” 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 151. See Lund, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 716 (“On May 5, 2014, the Supreme Court 
issued its opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway . . . . On January 20, 2015, the 
Parties here filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment, arguing the 
merits of the present case predominantly based upon the holdings of Town of 
Greece.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 152. See id. at 723 (pointing out that because the commissioners were the 
exclusive prayer givers, the policy could not be nondiscriminatory, which was a 
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reversed the district court’s decision and held that the Board’s 
prayer practice was constitutional.153 The panel of appellate judges 
said that the identity of the prayer- giver was not a critical factor 
to the analysis, and thus the practice aligned with the history and 
tradition sanctioned by Town of Greece.154 However, upon request, 
the court granted a rehearing en banc155 and affirmed the district 
court, holding that the Board’s prayer practice was 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.156 
The Fourth Circuit cited four key features of Rowan County’s 
legislative prayer practice which, taken together, created an 
unconstitutional pattern of prayer.157 The court focused on the fact 
that the lawmakers were the sole prayer-givers as the critical 
distinction from Marsh and Town of Greece.158 And within the 
context of legislator-led prayer, the court found that four factors of 
the operation of the prayer practice — the commissioners being the 
exclusive prayer-givers; the consistent, singular faith of the 
prayers; the commissioners’ invitation for the meeting attendees 
to participate in the prayers; and the local government 
setting — rendered the practice unconstitutional.159 The court 
analyzed each of these four factors and emphasized that the court 
must consider the interplay of the factors, not isolated facts.160 The 
                                                                                                     
critical characteristic of constitutionality under Town of Greece (citing Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014))). 
 153. See Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 430–31 (4th Cir.) (“The Board’s 
legislative prayer practice falls within our recognized tradition and does not 
coerce participation by nonadherents.”), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), reh’g en 
banc granted, 670 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 
(4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018).  
 154. See id. at 418 (recalling that several pre-Town of Greece Fourth Circuit 
decisions held that the identity of the prayer giver was not a relevant 
consideration). 
 155. Lund v. Rowan County, 670 F. App’x 106, 107 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 156. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(declaring that the rehearing was reviewed de novo (citation omitted)), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 157. See id. at 280 (“Within the universe of prayers delivered by legislators, 
the constitutionality of a particular government’s approach ultimately will 
depend on other aspects of the prayer practice.”). 
 158. See id. (“The Board’s prayer practice thus pushes this case well outside 
the confines of Town of Greece and indeed outside the realm of lawmaker-led 
prayer itself.”). 
 159. Id. at 281. 
 160. See id. at 289 (“But when a court looks to the totality of the circumstances 
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court stressed the holistic consideration of the context and pattern 
of the prayer practice because “the citizens of Rowan County are 
not experiencing the prayer practice piece by piece by piece. It 
comes at them whole. It would seem elementary that a thing may 
be innocuous in isolation and impermissible in combination.”161 
Judge Wilkinson, writing for the majority, concluded his analysis 
by finding that this case pushed beyond any potential line of 
constitutionality, observing that “[i]f the prayer practice here were 
to pass constitutional muster, we would be hard-pressed to identify 
any constitutional limitations on legislative prayer.”162 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Rejection of Lund 
In Bormuth v. County of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit sharply 
split with the Fourth in holding that Jackson County’s legislative 
prayer practice was constitutional under the Establishment 
Clause.163 While the Board of Jackson County, Michigan mirrored 
Rowan County’s prayer practices, the court found in a 9 – 6 decision 
that the pattern of prayer was consistent with Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.164 The Sixth Circuit’s decision was issued on 
September 6, 2017,165 a mere two months after the Fourth 
Circuit’s.166  
                                                                                                     
to assess the constitutionality of a prayer practice, as the Supreme Court says we 
must, a fact may be relevant to the court’s inquiry while not 
outcome-determinative.”). 
 161. See id. (rejecting the dissent’s argument that each factor “standing alone 
[is] undoubtedly constitutional”). 
 162. See id. at 290 (deriding the dissent’s suggestion that the Board would 
still be barred from endorsing a particular church or issuing official decisions on 
the basis of an individual’s participation, or lack thereof, in the prayers). 
 163. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 519 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (determining that the invocation practice was consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018); see also id. at 509 n.5 (“We 
recognize our view regarding Jackson County’s invocation practice is in conflict 
with the Fourth Circuit’s recent en banc decision. However . . . we find the Fourth 
Circuit’s majority en banc opinion unpersuasive.” (citations omitted)).  
 164. See id. at 519 (“Jackson County’s invocation practice is consistent with 
Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway and does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.”). 
 165. Id. at 494. 
 166. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 268 (deciding the rehearing on July 14, 2017). 
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Similar to the Board in Lund, the Jackson County Board of 
Commissioners opened its monthly meetings with prayers given 
exclusively by the commissioners.167 The Board’s chairman began 
each meeting by asking both the commissioners and attendees to 
“rise and assume a reverent position.”168 While the Board’s prayer 
policy was facially neutral with respect to the religion of the 
invocations, the prayers given were consistently Christian in tone 
and content.169 The plaintiff, who identified as a Pagan and 
Animist,170 objected to the practice and stated that the prayers 
made him feel like “he [was] being forced to worship Jesus Christ 
in order to participate in the business of County Government.”171 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Lund,172 he did not stand and participate 
in the prayer portions of the meetings.173 Notably, when the 
plaintiff voiced his concerns about the prayer practice during the 
public comment portion of a meeting, one of the commissioners 
swiveled his chair around in order to turn his back to the 
plaintiff.174 A month after filing this case in August of 2013, the 
Board rejected the plaintiff’s application for appointment to 
Jackson County’s Solid Waste Planning Committee in favor of two 
                                                                                                     
 167. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (explaining that the Board was comprised 
of nine elected representatives and governed Jackson County, Michigan). 
 168. See id. (expanding that other variations used by the chairman included 
statements such as: “Everyone please stand. Please bow your heads”; “Please bow 
your heads and let us pray”; and “If everyone could stand and please take a 
reverent stance”). 
 169. See id. (providing that the prayers often asked “‘God,’ ‘Lord,’ or ‘Heavenly 
Father’ to provide the Commissioners with guidance as they go about their 
business”). 
 170. See id. (“In [the plaintiff’s] words, the ‘prayers are unwelcome and 
severely offensive to [him] as a believer in the Pagan religion, which was 
destroyed by followers of Jesus Christ.’”). 
 171. See id. at 498–99 (adding that the plaintiff felt “like he [was] in Church” 
during the “distinctly Christian prayers offered by the Commissioners”). 
 172. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(explaining that the plaintiffs stood for the prayers to avoid standing out), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 173. Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 499. 
 174. See id. (stating that the plaintiff was “insulted and offended” by this 
action); see also Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 270–71 (6th Cir.) 
(adding that the commissioner “made faces expressing his disgust” at the 
plaintiff), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on 
reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).   
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lesser-qualified applicants, cementing the plaintiff’s fears of 
retaliation for not participating in the prayers.175 
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment in December of 
2013.176 After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Town of 
Greece, the plaintiff filed a revised motion for summary judgment 
at the direction of the magistrate judge.177 The district court 
rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court find 
for the plaintiff and instead found that the prayer practice was 
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence.178 On appeal, a 
panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed in favor of the plaintiff, finding 
that the prayer practice strayed “too far from [the Establishment 
Clause’s] purpose and effect” and was therefore 
unconstitutional.179 However, on rehearing en banc, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the prayer practice 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.180 
The Sixth Circuit framed its inquiry in reference to the 
historical practices previously permitted by the Supreme Court.181 
The majority focused on whether the fact that the legislators 
themselves were the exclusive prayer-givers was significant 
enough to deviate from the Marsh and Town of Greece holdings.182 
                                                                                                     
 175. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff filed his revised motion in 
September 2014, four months after the Supreme Court decided Town of Greece). 
 178. See id. (recounting that the district court “found Jackson County’s prayer 
practice to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Marsh and Town 
of Greece”). 
 179. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 275–76, 291 (6th Cir.) 
(recalling that Town of Greece gave several examples of when a prayer practice 
might deviate from this tradition, including “patterns of proselytization, 
denigration, discrimination, or censorship of religious speech” (citing Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579–86 (2014))), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
 180. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (concluding that the prayer practice was 
consistent with Town of Greece and Marsh).  
 181. See id. at 509 (“At the heart of this appeal is whether Jackson County’s 
prayer practice falls outside our historically accepted traditions because the 
Commissioners themselves, not chaplains, or invited community members, lead 
the invocations.”). 
 182. See id. at 509–10 (recounting the historical practice of legislative prayer 
in reference to Marsh and Town of Greece). 
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The court relied on data from an amicus brief showing the 
prevalence of legislative prayer at all levels of government across 
the country, particularly noting jurisdictions that featured 
primarily or exclusively lawmaker-led prayer.183 By continually 
referencing the “long-standing tradition”184 of legislative prayer, 
the Sixth Circuit focused on the overarching similarities between 
the permitted Marsh and Town of Greece practices and the prayers 
given in Jackson County, rather than on the key factual differences 
that motivated the Fourth Circuit decision.185 The Sixth Circuit 
called the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion “unpersuasive”186 and 
the factors “insignificant”187 in assessing the constitutionality of 
the legislative prayer practice. 
IV. An Examination of Lund’s Four Factors for Unconstitutional 
Prayer 
In Lund, the Fourth Circuit referenced four factors that, when 
considered through the framework of legislator-led prayer, created 
an unconstitutional prayer practice:188 “(1) commissioners as the 
sole prayer-givers; (2) invocations that drew exclusively on 
Christianity and sometimes served to advance that faith; 
(3) invitations to attendees to participate; and (4) the local 
government setting.”189 While each of these four factors was 
                                                                                                     
 183. See id. at 510–11 (contextualizing the practice by noting that forty-seven 
state chambers allow individuals other than legislative chaplains to give prayers, 
including legislators). 
 184. See id. at 509 (“Most significantly, history shows that legislator-led 
prayer is a long-standing tradition.”). 
 185. See id. at 512 (declining “the invitation to find an appreciable difference 
between legislator-led and legislator-authorized prayer given its historical 
pedigree” and finding it “insignificant that the prayer-givers in this case are 
publicly-elected officials”). 
 186. See id. at 509 n.5 (addressing the conflicted holding with that in Lund). 
 187. See id. at 512 (affirming the district court’s holding that there was no 
appreciable difference between prayers given by clergy and prayers given by 
lawmakers). 
 188. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(clarifying that it is the combination of these factors, rather than any one factor, 
which created an unconstitutional practice), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 189. See id. (“As the exclusive prayer-givers, Rowan County’s elected 
representatives—the very embodiment of the state—delivered sectarian 
invocations referencing one and only one religion. They asked their constituents 
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present in Bormuth, the Sixth Circuit did not find them significant 
enough to render the prayer practice impermissible.190 In light of 
the lack of clear guidance on this issue from the Supreme Court,191 
these four factors can serve as a helpful framework for other courts 
considering legislator-led prayer cases. 
The importance of these factors lies not in their application as 
a bright line test of constitutionality, but rather in the values that 
underlie each factor. These values must align not only with Marsh 
and Town of Greece,192 but also with the Supreme Court’s broader 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.193 And while the Sixth 
Circuit was more accepting of the factual contentions at issue, the 
Fourth Circuit took a more skeptical approach, seeing each of the 
four factors as the antithesis of the values espoused in Marsh and 
Town of Greece.194 
A. The Commissioners as the Sole Prayer-Givers 
The first factor the Fourth Circuit examined in Lund was the 
fact that the five commissioners “maintain[ed] exclusive and 
                                                                                                     
to join them in worship. They did so at every meeting of a local governing body 
for many years.”). 
 190. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 518 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (distinguishing between the Jackson County Board’s actions and Rowan 
County’s), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
 191. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir.) (“There 
are only two Supreme Court cases that have considered the constitutionality of 
legislative prayer—Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece—and neither one 
provides much instruction beyond establishing that legislative-prayer claims 
occupy a unique place in First Amendment jurisprudence.”), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 
494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).    
 192. See Barry P. McDonald, Democracy’s Religion: Religious Liberty in the 
Rehnquist Court and into the Roberts Court, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 2179, 2228–29 
(2016) (discussing the values at play in Marsh and Town of Greece). 
 193. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion 
Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 37–63 (2004) (proposing a list of Establishment 
Clause values); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, The Continuing Relevance of the 
Establishment Clause: A Reply to Professor Richard C. Schragger, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
SEE ALSO 125, 136–38 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause values). 
 194. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 282 (stating that “Rowan County regrettably sent 
the opposite message” to the religious pluralism in Town of Greece). 
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complete control over the content of the prayers.”195 This was 
critical because it was the only factor that the Supreme Court did 
not encounter in either Town of Greece or Marsh.196 In Marsh, the 
prayers were given by a chaplain who was paid at public 
expense.197 In Town of Greece, they were given by unpaid volunteer 
clergy from the community.198 In both Lund199 and Bormuth,200 the 
invocations were given exclusively by the legislators themselves. 
The Fourth Circuit viewed this factor as containing two critical 
features: (1 that it was government actors themselves giving the 
prayers, rather than outside clergy; and (2) that the legislators had 
the exclusive prayer opportunity, creating a “closed-universe” of 
prayer-givers.201 When the legislators are the ones consistently 
giving the prayers, the line between church and state begins to 
blur.202 
                                                                                                     
 195. See id. at 281 (contrasting Rowan County’s practice with that in Town of 
Greece) (citation omitted). 
 196. See id. (“In Marsh the prayer-giver was paid by the state. In Town of 
Greece, the prayer-giver was invited by the state. But in Rowan County, the 
prayer-giver was the state itself.”); see also Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 
F.3d 266, 281 (6th Cir.) (“A combination of factors distinguishes this case from 
the practice upheld in Marsh and Town of Greece, including one important factor: 
the identity of the prayer giver.”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 
694 (6th Cir.), on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 
S. Ct. 2708 (2018).  
 197. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983) (“The Nebraska 
Legislature begins each of its sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain who is 
chosen biennially by the Executive Board of the Legislative Council and paid out 
of public funds.”). 
 198. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 571 (2014) (detailing the 
town’s procedure of inviting clergy from the congregations listed in the town 
directory to give the opening prayer). 
 199. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 272–73 (reporting that every board meeting began 
“with a prayer composed and delivered by one of the commissioners” and that 
“[n]o one outside the Board [was] permitted to offer an invocation”). 
 200. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 509 (“At the heart of this appeal is whether 
Jackson County’s prayer practice falls outside our historically accepted tradition 
because the Commissioners themselves, not chaplains, or invited community 
members, lead the invocations.”). 
201. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 277 (establishing that these two features are critical 
in combination with the other factors in creating an unconstitutional practice).  
202. See Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 533 (W.D. Va. 2015) 
(contending, in a case factually similar to Lund and Bormuth, that where the 
legislators are the exclusive prayer givers “there is no distinction between the 
prayer giver and the government. They are one and the same”). 
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The Fourth Circuit did not find that lawmaker-led prayer is 
per se unconstitutional; rather, the court concluded that the 
“identity of the prayer-giver is relevant to the constitutional 
inquiry.”203 By not allowing others to give the invocation, the Board 
was “arrogating the prayer opportunity to itself,” which the 
Supreme Court had previously struck down in cases concerning 
state-prescribed prayer.204 In Engel v. Vitale,205 the Supreme Court 
found that a New York law directing public schools to recite a 
state-written prayer every morning constituted a “religious 
activity” which violated the Establishment Clause.206 The Court 
stated that “it is no part of the business of the government to 
compose official prayers.”207 Later, the Court quoted this 
“cornerstone principle”208 of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
in Lee v. Weisman,209 which found that a public school’s practice of 
inviting a rabbi or other clergy to pray at graduation ceremonies 
and providing the prayer-giver with a pamphlet containing 
guidelines for the prayer’s contents violated the Establishment 
Clause.210 Because the prayers constitute government speech,211 
                                                                                                     
203. Lund, 863 F.3d at 280.  
204. See id. at 281 (recalling the Supreme Court’s prohibitions on 
government-composed prayer in Engel v. Vitale and Lee v. Weisman).  
205. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
206. See id. at 424–25 (“There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s 
program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the 
Regents’ prayer is a religious activity.”). 
 207. Id. at 425. 
 208. Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 
(2018). 
 209. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 210. See id. at 588–89 (“The question is not the good faith of the school in 
attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of 
its undertaking that enterprise at all when the object is to produce a prayer to be 
used in a formal religious exercise . . . .”). 
 211. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 290 (“When one of Rowan County’s commissioners 
leads his constituents in prayer, he is not just another private citizen. He is the 
representative of the state, and he gives the invocation in his official capacity as 
a commissioner.”); see also supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (explaining 
legislative prayer as government speech); Turner v. City Council of 
Fredericksburg, 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 2008) (O’Connor, J., retired, sitting 
by designation) (articulating that legislative prayer given exclusively by members 
of a city council constituted government speech). In Turner, Justice O’Connor, 
retired and sitting by designation with the Fourth Circuit, based its conclusion 
on a four-factor test for assessing when speech is government speech. Id. The four 
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the Fourth Circuit found that “[t]he Board was thus ‘elbow-deep in 
the activities banned by the Establishment Clause — selecting and 
prescribing sectarian prayers.’”212 
Rather than focusing on the underlying implications of the 
legislators as the exclusive prayer-givers, the Sixth Circuit relied 
on the pervasive nature of legislator-led prayer across the country 
and the Supreme Court’s stated purpose for constitutional 
legislative prayer in finding it “insignificant that the prayer-givers 
in this case are publicly-elected officials.”213 The Sixth Circuit cited 
studies presented by Jackson County finding that in forty-seven 
state legislative chambers, prayers are given by someone other 
than a legislative or visiting chaplain.214 Specifically, in Rhode 
Island, members are the only individuals allowed to pray, and in 
the Michigan House of Representatives, prayers are to be given “by 
the Member or a Member’s guest.”215 The court finally noted an 
example of legislator-led prayer in Congress.216 
The Sixth Circuit observed that legislator-led prayer made 
sense given legislative prayer’s constitutionally permitted 
                                                                                                     
factors included: 
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in 
question occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the 
government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the 
identity of the “literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the 
private entity bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the content of the 
speech. 
Id. (numbers in original) (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r 
of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002)). 
 212. Lund, 863 F.3d at 281 (quoting Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 
434 (4th Cir.), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 670 F. App’x 
106 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (panel dissent)).   
 213. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 512 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (“In our view and consistent with our Nation’s historical tradition, prayers 
by agents (like in Marsh and Town of Greece) are not constitutionally different 
from prayers offered by principals.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
2708 (2018). 
 214. See id. at 511 (pointing out that in those chambers “[l]egislators, chamber 
clerks and secretaries, or other staff” may give the prayers (emphasis in original)). 
 215. See id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted) (reporting that in the 
Sixth Circuit there are over one-hundred counties that permit lawmaker-led 
prayer). 
 216. See id. (referencing Oklahoma Senator James Lankford’s prayer on May 
23, 2015). 
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purpose.217 In Town of Greece, the Supreme Court stated that 
legislative prayer is “meant to lend gravity to the occasion and 
reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage,” and that “[p]rayer 
that is solemn and respectful in tone, that invites lawmakers to 
reflect upon shared ideals and common ends before they embark 
on the fractious business of governing, serves that legitimate 
function.”218 In light of the prevalence and purpose of legislative 
prayer, the Sixth Circuit found no issue with the legislators’ giving 
prayers.219 
 While the constitutionality of legislator-led prayer is 
debatable, the significance of this first Lund factor hinges on the 
“closed-universe” of prayer-givers present in both in Lund220 and 
Bormuth.221 In Marsh222 and Town of Greece,223 the Supreme Court 
stated that the inclusive nature of the prayer practices was critical 
to its constitutionality. In Marsh, the Court considered the fact 
that a clergyman of the same faith had been continually 
reappointed for sixteen years, but found there was no conflict with 
the Establishment Clause because “Palmer was not the only 
clergyman heard by the Legislature; guest chaplains have 
officiated at the request of various legislators and as substitutes 
during Palmer’s absences.”224 And while the town in Town of 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. (“This tradition of legislator-led prayer makes sense in light of 
legislative prayer’s purpose . . . .”). 
 218. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 582–83 (2014). 
 219. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 512 (concluding that “prayers by agents (like 
in Marsh and Town of Greece) are not constitutionally different from prayers 
offered by principals”). 
 220. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(focusing on the fact that the board members were the only ones permitted to give 
a prayer at meetings), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 221. See Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 498 (describing Jackson County’s “rotating 
basis” by which board members gave their prayers). 
 222. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983) (highlighting the fact 
that the Nebraska state legislature received prayers from guest chaplains at the 
request of various legislators in addition to the legislative chaplain on staff). 
 223. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585 (evaluating that the town had made 
“reasonable efforts” to ensure religious representation in its pre-meeting prayers 
and that the town had made clear that it “would welcome a prayer by any minister 
or layman who wished to give one”). 
 224. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 (asserting that the inclusive nature of the 
prayer practice indicated that the clergyman was reappointed due to his personal 
qualities, rather than his specific faith); see also Chambers v. Marsh, 504 F. Supp. 
585, 592 (D. Neb. 1980) (“From time to time various senators have asked whether 
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Greece initially used an informal method for soliciting 
prayer-givers, which yielded exclusively Christian ministers from 
1999 to 2007, once the plaintiffs complained about the overtly 
Christian nature of the prayers, the town invited a Jewish layman 
and the chairman of the local Baha’i temple to pray, and granted 
the request of a Wiccan priestess to pray as well.225 In the words of 
the Court, “[t]he town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the 
congregations located within its borders and represented that it 
would welcome a prayer by any minster or layman who wished to 
give one.”226  
Conversely, the Boards of Commissioners in both Rowan and 
Jackson Counties made the conscious decision to deny members of 
the public the opportunity to pray before meetings.227 In defending 
the Board’s decision to exclude outside prayers, one Jackson 
County commissioner stated that 
I think we are opening a Pandora’s Box here because you are 
going to get members of the public who are going to come up at 
public comment and we are going to create a lot of problems 
here when certain people come up here and say things that they 
are not going to like.228  
Similarly, with respect to religious minorities, one Rowan County 
commissioner commented to a newspaper, “I am sick and tired of 
being told by the minority what’s best for the majority. My friends, 
we’ve come a long way — the wrong way. We call evil good and good 
                                                                                                     
their own clergypersons might be invited, and in those instances the chaplain has 
always honored the requests, including one of the Jewish faith.”), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982), rev’d, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 225. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571–73. 
 226. See id. at 585 (indicating further that “nearly all of the congregations in 
town turned out to be Christian does not reflect an aversion or bias on the part of 
town leaders against minority faiths”). 
 227. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 272 (demonstrating that the lawmakers being the 
exclusive prayer-givers distinguished the case from the “more inclusive, 
minister-oriented” practice in Town of Greece). 
 228. Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir.), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 F.3d 
494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). At the same meeting, that 
Jackson County commissioner also expressed his worries that: 
We all know that any one of us could go online and become an ordained 
minister in about ten minutes. Um, so if somebody from the public 
wants to come before us and say that they are an ordained minister we 
are going to have to allow them as well. Id.  
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evil.”229 Rather than fostering inclusive environments for audience 
members of minority or no faiths, these Boards have used their role 
as exclusive prayer-givers to effectively shut out faiths they do not 
agree with. 
This factor is a necessary one because, if left unchecked, the 
practice of exclusively legislator-led prayer could result in religious 
entanglement with elections, where voters are hyper-concerned 
with the religious views of candidates and with what kinds of 
prayers they would give once in office.230 The Sixth Circuit 
applauded the use of elections to ensure that legislators represent 
the faiths the voters desire, noting that “[w]ith each election, the 
people of Jackson County may elect a Commissioner who is 
Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Mormon, Roman Catholic, 
Eastern Orthodox Christian, Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Lutheran, Episcopalian, Congregationalist, Quaker, Amish, 
Mennonite, Pentecostal, Animist, Pagan, Atheist, or 
Agnostic . . . .”231 However, the Supreme Court has expressly 
stated that “fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
                                                                                                     
 229. Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 715 (M.D.N.C. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir.), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), on reh’g en 
banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.), and aff’d, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (originally 
quoted in School Board: Bible Classes Stay, Curriculum to Undergo Evaluation, 
SALISBURY POST (Oct. 10, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.salisburypost.com/ 
2014/10/10/school-board-bible-classes-stay-curriculum-to-undergo-evaluation/ 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 230. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 282 (“Voters may wonder what kind of prayer a 
candidate of a minority religious persuasion would select if elected.” (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 231. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 513 (6th Cir. 2017) (en 
banc) (expanding on the idea that there was no evidence concerning the 
commissioners’ religious denominations, so the denominations “may have 
included Roman Catholics, Southern Baptists, Mormons, Quakers, Episcopalians, 
Lutherans, Methodists, and others”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018); see also 
id. (recalling that the Supreme Court upheld the Presbyterian clergyman’s 
sixteen-year employment in Marsh (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 
(1983))); but see Fields v. Speaker of Pa. House of Representatives, 327 
F. Supp. 3d 748, 761 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (“As evinced by modern legislative prayer 
cases and other Establishment Clause jurisprudence, constitutional challenges to 
prayer practices typically allege an impermissible government preference for 
Christianity in general, rather than one particular Christian denomination.” 
(internal citations omitted)); id. (“None of these [legislative prayer] decisions 
suggests that if different Christian sects were represented, a legislative prayer 
practice solely advancing Christianity would pass constitutional muster.”). 
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depend on the outcome of no elections.”232 As the lead dissent in 
the original Fourth Circuit decision noted, allowing this “single 
faith reality” to continue “takes us one step closer to a de facto 
religious litmus test for public office.”233 If these prayer patterns 
were permitted, it would not only unjustly exclude minority faiths 
from legislative prayer practices, but it would also entangle 
religion and government in an unprecedented way.234 
Underlying the consideration of the commissioners as the sole 
prayer-givers is the idea of control.235 By allowing outsiders to give 
the opening invocations at meetings, the government is yielding 
some of its control over the proceedings.236 While there are 
certainly logistical arguments to be made in favor of legislator-led 
prayer, courts should look to the ways in which this practice 
                                                                                                     
 232. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304–05 (2000) (quoting 
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)); see also Ledewitz, 
supra note 37, at 104 (“If the Constitution does not aid us in finding common 
ground among all these groups, we will end up voting for and against God in all 
future elections. This possibility promises deep political strife.”). 
 233. Lund v. Rowan County, 837 F.3d 407, 435 (4th Cir.), as amended (Sept. 
21, 2016), reh’g en banc granted, 670 F. App’x 106 (4th Cir. 2016), and on reh’g en 
banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018) (Wilkinson, 
J., dissenting). Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, who authored the dissent in the 
original Fourth Circuit decision and the majority in the rehearing opinion, further 
noted that 
When delivering the same sectarian prayers becomes embedded 
legislative custom, voters may wonder what kind of prayer a candidate 
of a minority religious persuasion would select if elected. Failure to 
pray in the name of the prevailing faith risks becoming a campaign 
issue or a tacit political debit, which in turn deters those of minority 
faiths from seeking office. It should not be so.  
Id. 
 234. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (clarifying that courts 
should consider governmental entanglement with religion by assessing the 
character and purposes of the relationship, the nature of the aid being provided, 
and the resulting relationship between the religious institution and the state). 
 235. See James H. Knippen II & Elizabeth M. Farmer, Does Prayer Before 
Public Bodies Violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?, 24 
DCBA BRIEF 28, 33 (2011) (“If legislative invocations constitute government 
speech, then applying this doctrine means the government has ‘unqualified 
control over the religious message.’” (quoting Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the 
Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 46, 56 (2009))). 
 236. See Secret Costs, supra note 72, at 1030–31 (discussing the issue of 
control with public forums as a potential solution to legislative prayer concerns). 
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becomes an instrument of government control.237 In Lund and 
Bormuth, the control was being used to regulate the content of the 
prayers and the religious doctrine in an impermissible way.238 This 
control sends the “opposite message” of the inclusivity in Town of 
Greece,239 and thereby defies the values espoused by the Supreme 
Court. 
B. Promotion of a System of Beliefs 
The second factor the Fourth Circuit discussed was that the 
invocations “drew exclusively on Christianity and sometimes 
served to advance that faith.”240 While the courts are not to parse 
the contents of particular prayers,241 they are free to assess an 
overall pattern of prayer to determine if a practice is permissible 
under the Establishment Clause or if it is coercive and therefore 
unconstitutional.242 In considering this factor, it is important to 
remember the “clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause” — that “one religious denomination cannot be officially 
preferred over another.”243 The purpose of the Establishment 
                                                                                                     
 237. See Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1100 (9th Cir. 2013) (“It 
is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that ‘it is no 
part of the business of government to compose official prayers,’ or ‘direct[ ] and 
control[ ]’ their content.” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 (1992); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962))). 
 238. See infra Part IV.B (exploring the exclusively-Christian nature of the 
prayers). 
 239. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 282 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(contrasting the prayer practice in Lund with the practice in Town of Greece), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 240. Id. at 281.  
 241. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (articulating that, 
where there is no evidence of prayer exploitation or proselytization, “[t]he content 
of the prayer is not of concern to judges . . .”).  
 242. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 590 (2014) (“Courts 
remain free to review the pattern of prayers over time to determine whether they 
comport with the tradition of solemn, respectful prayer approved in Marsh, or 
whether coercion is a real and substantial likelihood.”). 
 243. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). The Supreme Court has 
since quoted this language in subsequent Establishment Clause cases. Trump v. 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 619 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 719 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714 (1994) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text 
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Clause is to protect religious freedom and prevent “political 
division along religious lines”244 by “ensuring governmental 
neutrality in matters of religion.”245 This protection is to be based 
on the perceptions of a reasonable person, one who is aware of the 
tradition and the purpose of legislative prayer.246 In these 
circumstances, it is safe to assume that a reasonable observer 
would be mindful that the purpose of legislative prayer is to 
provide a moment of reflection for legislators as they embark on 
the task of governing.247 However, as noted by the Fourth Circuit, 
a reasonable observer would also note the overall pattern of a 
consistent invocation of a singular faith248 and would rationally 
believe that the government is supporting that one faith.249  
This observation is corroborated by the commissioners’ 
statements to the media concerning the prayer practice. In Lund, 
various commissioners made comments to the local television news 
                                                                                                     
(discussing the meaning and implications of the Establishment Clause).  
 244. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622 (adding that “[t]he political divisiveness of 
such conflict is a threat to the normal political process”  
(internal citations omitted)). 
 245. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971)  
The metaphor of a “wall” or impassable barrier between Church and State, taken 
too literally, may mislead constitutional analysis, but the Establishment Clause 
stands at least for the proposition that when government activities touch on the 
religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and 
neutral in primary impact. 
(Internal citations omitted). 
 246. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“In cases 
involving state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions 
is ‘whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, 
and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of 
prayer in public schools.’” (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 247. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587–88 (describing the audience of 
legislative prayers as being lawmakers who “may find that a moment of prayer or 
quiet reflection sets the mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the task of 
governing”).  
 248. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 283 (detailing how over the course of five years, 
139 out of 143 prayers were sectarian, and those 139 (or 97%) all “use[d] ideas or 
images identified with [Christianity]” (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588 
(1992))). 
 249. See id. at 284 (“When the state’s representatives so emphatically evoke 
a single religion in nearly every prayer over a period of many years, that faith 
comes to be perceived as the one true faith, not merely of individual prayer-givers, 
but of government itself.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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and other media in which they clearly articulated their intentions 
to continue to give Christian prayers at Board meetings.250 One 
commissioner stated that he would “continue to pray in JESUS 
name,” and he volunteered “to be the first to go to jail for this 
cause”; if another commissioner paid his bail “in time for the next 
meeting, [he would] go again!”251 Similarly, in Bormuth, 
commissioners spoke to the local media frankly about their 
personal beliefs and the purpose of the pre-meeting prayers.252 One 
commissioner was reported to say that the plaintiff was attacking 
the Board and, in his eyes, his beliefs.253 The commissioner further 
stated that “[o]ur civil liberties should not be taken away from us, 
as commissioners.”254 In response to the plaintiff’s contention 
about the prayers, another commissioner commented that 
The Federalist Papers, if you read them, tell[ ] me that it is your 
duty to disobey an illegal law. And it has taken some nitwit 
two-hundred-and-some years to come up with an angle like this 
to try to deprive me or other people, of my faith, of my rights.255 
                                                                                                     
 250. Lund v. Rowan County, 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 714–15 (M.D.N.C. 2015), 
rev’d and remanded, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2016), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), 
on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.), and aff’d, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 251. See id. at 715 (quoting another commissioner as stating “I will continue 
to pray in Jesus’ name. I am not perfect so I need all the help I can get, and asking 
for guidance for my decisions from Jesus is the best I, and Rowan County, can 
ever hope for”); see also id. (quoting the same commissioner as stating, concerning 
religious minorities, that, “I am sick and tired of being told by the minority what’s 
best for the majority. My friends, we’ve come a long way—the wrong way. We call 
evil good and good evil”). 
 252. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (quoting several of the commissioners’ statements as reported in a local 
newspaper), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).  
 253. See id. (quoting another commissioner as stating that “[a]ll this political 
correctness, after a while I get sick of it”). 
 254. See id. (adding that another commissioner commented “[w]hat about my 
rights? . . . If a guy doesn’t want to hear a public prayer, he can come into the 
meeting two minutes late”). 
 255. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 849 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir.) 
(elaborating that in that same public meeting, a different commissioner asserted 
that the pending lawsuit was an “attack on Christianity and Jesus Christ, period.” 
(citing CountyofJackson, Personnel & Finance Committee November 12, 2013 
Jackson County, MI, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= yOOClwZpaXc (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review))) (emphasis in original), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 855 F.3d 694 (6th Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 870 
F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018). 
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These public comments, combined with the overwhelming pattern 
of Christian prayer, paint a clear picture of an intent by the 
legislators to associate the government with one faith. 
The Sixth Circuit did not find that the prayers offered were 
unconstitutional, relying on Town of Greece’s insistence that a 
board need not seek out a diverse range of religious views, which 
would require the town “to make wholly inappropriate judgments 
about the number of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative 
frequency with which it should sponsor each.”256 But while the 
singular faith of the prayers may not need to be determinative of 
legislative prayer challenges, the consistent discrimination 
against minority faiths should not be ignored by courts.257 This 
factor requires courts to consider the singularity of the challenged 
practices, giving specific factual consideration to the surrounding 
context.258 When, as here, this singularity is used to shut minority 
faiths out of the prayer process, it becomes impermissible.259 
C. Invitations for Attendees to Participate 
The third factor the Fourth Circuit cited was that the 
commissioners would tell meeting attendees to rise and participate 
                                                                                                     
 256. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585–86 (2014) (quoting Lee v. 
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 257. See Robert Luther III, “Unity Through Division”: Religious Liberty and 
the Virtue of Pluralism in the Context of Legislative Prayer Controversies, 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 32 (2009) (“Indeed, a twenty-first century reading of Marsh 
requires greater latitude for judicial interpretation in this area when legislatures 
engage in viewpoint discrimination to prohibit individuals from minority religions 
equal access to the legislative prayer podium.”); see also Williamson v. Brevard 
County, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (“[W]hile legislative 
prayer—even sectarian legislative prayer—is, as a general matter, constitutional, 
intentional discrimination and improper motive can take a prayer practice beyond 
what the Establishment Clause permits.”). 
 258. See supra notes 114–123 and accompanying text (outlining Town of 
Greece’s instructions for a context and fact-sensitive inquiry). 
 259. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 283 
(4th Cir. 2005) (“[R]epeated invocation of the tenets of a single faith undermined 
our commitment to participation by persons of all faiths in public life.”); id. 
(“Advancing one specific creed at the outset of each public meeting runs counter 
to our credo of American pluralism and discourages the diverse views on which 
our democracy depends.”); Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 
534 (W.D. Va. 2015) (discussing the unconstitutional relationship between the 
control exercised by the board and the singularity of faith). 
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in the invocations.260 This factor is especially salient, given the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Town of Greece that the “analysis 
would be different if town board members directed the public to 
participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, 
or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person’s 
acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”261 In his opinion Justice 
Kennedy continued to note that, while occasionally meeting 
attendees were asked to stand for the prayer, those “requests, 
however, came not from town leaders but from the guest ministers, 
who presumably [were] accustomed to directing their 
congregations in this way and might have done so thinking the 
action was inclusive, not coercive.”262 The Supreme Court’s express 
caution about calls to worship by town board members validates 
the legitimacy of this factor as one that courts should consider in 
legislative prayer questions.  
The request for meeting attendees to rise and participate in 
the prayer makes it harder for individuals to opt out if the prayer 
is not in line with their beliefs or if they do not feel comfortable 
participating.263 Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
offered the option for those who do not wish to participate in the 
prayer to leave the room during the invocation.264 However, it is 
hard to imagine that in the local government setting, with 
                                                                                                     
 260. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(providing various examples of such statements, including “[p]lease pray with 
me”; “[l]et’s pray together”; and “[l]et us pray” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 261. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). 
 262. See id. (acknowledging that town board members often stood for the 
prayers, bowed their heads, or made the sign of the cross during the prayer). 
 263. See id. at 620–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing the thought process 
of a citizen of a minority faith faced with the decision of how to proceed in the face 
of a call to legislative prayer). 
 264. See id. at 590 (“Nothing in the record suggests that members of the public 
are dissuaded from leaving the meeting room during the prayer [or] arriving 
late . . . . Should nonbelievers choose to exit the room during a prayer they find 
distasteful, their absence will not stand out as disrespectful or even noteworthy.”); 
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (contrasting a public school graduation 
ceremony with “[t]he atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state legislature 
where adults are free to enter and leave with little comment and for any number 
of reasons”); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. McCarty, 851 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Birdville Indep. Sch. Dist., 138 S. Ct. 470 
(2017) (contrasting the coercive pressures of school prayer with “ceremonial” 
prayer at a school board meeting). 
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meetings attended by a small number of people, that leaving the 
room or coming in late at every prayer would go unnoticed.265 
Furthermore, these invitations to participate may send a signal to 
those who do not wish to participate that they are outsiders to the 
political process.266 This message to nonadherents has been 
confirmed by scientific studies, which have found that lawmakers 
tend to favor individuals who share their faith,267 that majorities 
are inclined to question the motives of “outgroup” minority 
members,268 and that these suspicions are heightened in public 
settings, such as government meetings.269 When attendees are 
asked to stand and participate, it is easier to take note of 
nonadherents, and those who are uncomfortable with the prayer 
may feel pressured to follow along.270 In both Lund271 and 
                                                                                                     
 265. In Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, a district court was faced with a case 
that is factually on all fours with Lund and Bormuth. See 107 F. Supp. 3d at 525 
(recounting the County’s prayer practice as being entirely legislator-led and 
exclusively of one faith, with invitations for attendees to participate at the local 
government level). In that case, prior to the prayer a commissioner would say: “If 
you don’t want to hear this prayer, you can leave. Please stand up.” Id. at 535. 
The court there found that this came “far too close to ‘singl[ing] out dissidents for 
opprobrium’” and transcended “the boundaries of permissible legislative prayer 
demarcated in Town of Greece.” Id. (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 588). 
 266. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”). 
 267. See David Yamane, Faith and Access: Personal Religiosity and Religious 
Group Advocacy in a State Legislature, 38 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 543, 548– 49 
(1999) (discussing religious interest groups and the increased access they have to 
lawmakers who share their faith).  
 268. See Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Conformity, Group-Oriented Motivation, and 
Status Attainment in Small Groups, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 175, 187 (1978) 
(“[Nonconformity] attracts the group’s attention, but it also predisposes the group 
to negatively assess the nonconformer’s motivation . . . .”). 
 269. See Jeffrey G. Noel, Daniel L. Wann, & Nyla R. Branscombe, Peripheral 
Ingroup Membership Status and Public Negativity Toward Outgroups, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 134–35 (1995) (reviewing research concerning 
ingroup perceptions of outgroup members). 
 270. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1962) (“When the power, 
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular 
religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to 
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”). 
 271. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(highlighting the fact that plaintiffs felt excluded from the political process during 
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Bormuth,272 the plaintiffs expressed fears of standing out by not 
participating and stated that they had stood for the prayers out of 
pressure to do so.  
Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated that questions 
about legislative prayer are fact-sensitive and that courts must 
consider “both the setting in which the prayer arises and the 
audience to whom it is directed.”273 Legislative prayer is 
permissible when the audience is the lawmakers themselves, 
rather than the public.274 However, when the legislators ask 
meeting attendees to participate in a prayer, the audience shifts 
from the lawmakers to the public, where the invocation is a tool 
used to promote religious observation.275 One particularly salient 
example of this shift in audience was discussed in an amicus brief 
for Bormuth v. County of Jackson.276 The brief noted that “[t]he 
only meeting of the full Board of Commissioners during the past 
two years when no prayer was offered was the meeting that no 
members of the public attended.”277 The fact that the Board gave 
an opening invocation only in the presence of a public audience 
supports the need for courts to consider the audience of legislative 
                                                                                                     
the prayers and felt compelled to participate in order to not stick out), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 2564 (2018). 
 272. See Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498–99 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(en banc) (recounting that the plaintiff felt like he was in church during the 
prayers and that he was being forced to worship), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708 
(2018).  
 273. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 587 (2014). 
 274. See id. at 587–88 (“The principal audience for these invocations is not, 
indeed, the public but lawmakers themselves, who may find that a moment of 
prayer or quiet reflection sets the mind to a higher purpose and thereby eases the 
task of governing.”). 
 275. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 286–87 (describing the purpose of an internally 
focused prayer practice by the legislators in contrast with an externally focused 
practice for the audience). 
 276. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church 
& State in Support of Appellant & Reversal at 12–13, Bormuth v. County of 
Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1869), 2015 WL 5896215 (“[T]he 
Commissioners treat the prayers not as an opportunity to seek spiritual guidance 
for their own work, but as an opportunity to direct religious messages at Jackson 
County’s citizens.”). 
 277. Id. at 12 (citing CountyofJackson, November 6, 2014 Special Jackson 
County Board of Commissioners Meeting, YOUTUBE (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://tinyurl.com/2014nov6 (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review) (emphasis in original). 
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prayer and the ways in which meeting attendees are necessarily 
involved in such prayer. 
This factor points to the underlying coercive nature of the 
prayer practice. A prayer practice is coercive if there is a threat 
that benefits or burdens will be allocated based on participation in 
the prayer.278 Courts should consider instances where lawmakers 
are using their authority to pressure audience members into 
religious participation when legislative prayer challenges appear 
before them.279 This factor is of particular concern at the local 
government level, where lawmakers’ perceptions can have real and 
direct consequences on audience members’ lives.280 
D. The Local Government Setting 
The final factor considered by the Fourth Circuit was the local 
government setting of the prayer practice.281 While the Supreme 
Court did not find the local government setting to be definitive in 
Town of Greece,282 Justice Kennedy did charge courts with a 
                                                                                                     
 278. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 589 (discussing the lack of coercion in 
the practice at issue). 
 279. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“Government pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious 
indication that the government is endorsing or promoting a religion.”); Alan 
Brownstein, Constitutional Myopia: The Supreme Court’s Blindness to Religious 
Liberty and Religious Equality Values in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 48 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 371, 403 (2014) 
[C]oercive circumstances arise when an individual seeks a 
determination of his or her eligibility for benefits from a government 
bureaucrat or when a small town legislature deliberates on a matter of 
particular importance to a small group of residents. The pressure to 
comply with the invitation to rise and join in the offered prayer should 
be obvious to anyone. 
 280. See infra Part IV.D (assessing courts’ consideration of the local 
government setting in legislative prayer challenges). 
 281. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 287 (“The prayers here were delivered at the public 
meetings of a local government body, a fact that makes the other aspects of the 
county’s prayer practice even more questionable.”). 
 282. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586 (rejecting the contention that the 
local government setting of the prayer practice meant that the practice was 
unconstitutional). Because Marsh concerned prayer at the state level, the opinion 
did not address concerns surrounding the level of government. See Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784–85 (1983) (explaining the facts of the case arising 
from prayers at the Nebraska Legislature). 
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consideration of “the setting in which the prayer arises” in such 
cases.283 Given the intimate setting of local government meetings 
and the different role audience members may play, this factor is 
important to consider to ensure that legislator-led prayer does not 
act as a barrier to entry for civic engagement.284 
One key feature that heightens the importance of a local 
government setting over a state or federal one is that citizens tend 
to be more affected by actions of their local government.285 While 
individuals attending congressional or state legislature meetings 
are usually passive observers,286 citizens attend town meetings to, 
in the words of the Supreme Court, “accept awards; speak on 
                                                                                                     
 283. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 587. 
 284. See Joyner v. Forsyth County, 653 F.3d 341, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(“Sectarian prayers must not serve as the gateway to citizen participation in the 
affairs of local government. To have them do so runs afoul of the promise of public 
neutrality among faiths that resides at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses.”). Joyner v. Forsyth County was a pre-Town of Greece Fourth 
Circuit decision which was also authored by Judge Wilkinson, who wrote the 
majority opinion for the Lund rehearing. Id. at 342. In that case, the court 
concluded that sectarian prayer by local clergy before county board meetings was 
barred by the Establishment Clause. See id. at 355 (clarifying that “citizens 
should come to public meetings confident in the assurance that government plays 
no favorites in matters of faith but welcomes the participation of all”). 
 285. See Jeffrey M. Berry, Urban Interest Groups, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 502, 505 (L. Sandy Maisel 
& Jeffrey M. Berry eds., 2010) (arguing that, at the local level, “fights are often 
over what is going to happen to a particular place and these experiential facts are 
forcefully articulated by those who live or work in that particular place”); James 
A. Hill, Thou Shalt Not Speak: Why the Establishment Clause Should Be 
Concerned with Legislative Prayer in Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 23 TRINITY 
L. REV. 1, 30 (2018) (“Congress and state assemblies differ greatly from local town 
boards in size, function, and constituent responsiveness.”).  
 286. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 586 (2014) (acknowledging 
the argument that “prayer conducted in the intimate setting of a town board 
meeting differs in fundamental ways from the invocations delivered in Congress 
and state legislatures, where the public remains segregated from legislative 
activity and may not address the body except by occasional invitation.”); Watching 
Congress in Session, U.S. CAPITOL VISITOR CTR., 
https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/plan-visit/watching-congress-session (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2019) (outlining the policies and procedures of watching congressional 
sessions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Visitor Info, N.C. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/About/VisitorInfo (last visited Jan. 22, 
2019) (clarifying that visitors are not allowed on the floor of the North Carolina 
House or Senate, only in the public galleries) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). Visitor information for the Michigan State Legislature was 
unavailable online. 
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matters of local importance; and petition the board for action that 
may affect their economic interest, such as the granting of permits, 
business licenses, and zoning variances.”287 Further, the citizens 
who attend local government meetings are likely to have a vested 
interest in the board’s decisions or actions.288 A citizen with a 
significant personal or economic interest in a local government 
decision may feel compelled to participate in the legislative prayer 
in order to gain favor with the lawmakers who will be acting upon 
their request shortly thereafter.289 Additionally, members of local 
boards are frequently involved with the community and are likely 
to have relationships with meeting attendees outside of the 
governmental setting.290 This intimacy means that what happens 
at local meetings could percolate to other aspects of citizens’ lives, 
exacerbating the pressure to participate in the local government’s 
prayer.291 And, while attendees at state and congressional 
                                                                                                     
 287. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 586; see also Abrell, supra note 89, at 189 
(“[U]nlike at the state or national legislative levels where the average citizen is 
only present for an opening invocation in a singular or sporadic observance of his 
government . . . at the local level a citizen is usually present at a government 
meeting to accomplish a goal.”). 
 288. See Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 287 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) 
(“[C]itizens attend meetings to petition for valuable rights and benefits, to 
advocate on behalf of cherished causes, and to keep tabs on their elected 
representatives—in short, to participate in democracy.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
2564 (2018); see also Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public 
Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 424 
(2004) (explaining that local meetings “typically are attended primarily, if not 
uniquely, by avid proponents and opponents of a measure affecting them 
personally . . . ”); Brian Adams, Public Meetings and the Democratic Process, 64 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 43, 44 (2004) (discussing the importance of public hearings for 
citizen participation); Katherine A. McComas, John C. Besley, & Craig W. 
Trumbo, Why Citizens Do and Do Not Attend Public Meetings About Local Cancer 
Cluster Investigations, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 671, 675 (2006) (“[R]esearch has shown 
that people with higher levels of concern about a specific topic are more likely to 
attend public meetings about that topic.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 289. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (clarifying that the court was not implying 
that the board made decisions based off of acquiescence to the prayers, “[b]ut the 
fact remains that the Board considered individual petitions on the heels of the 
commissioners’ prayers”). 
 290. See Karen Tracy & Margaret Durfy, Speaking Out in Public: Citizen 
Participation in Contentious School Board Meetings, 1 DISCOURSE & COMM. 223, 
225 (2007) (explaining that local lawmakers and citizens “frequently have ongoing 
relationships with each other,” and they are “not just unknown ‘authorities’ and 
‘public audiences’”).  
 291. See Lund, 863 F.3d at 288 (recounting that the Board exercised authority 
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legislative meetings are usually seated in a gallery separate from 
the lawmakers, the physical setting of a local government meeting, 
whose attendees sit at a close distance facing the legislators, 
means that lawmakers are acutely aware of who is attending the 
meeting and when they do, or do not, participate in prayer.292 
Although the intimate, familiar setting of local government 
activity can be beneficial for lawmakers and citizens alike,293 
courts should consider the ways in which this setting could 
intensify pressure to participate in a legislative prayer.  
Additionally, while federal and state legislatures generally do 
not require participation from citizens in lawmaking, it is often 
necessary for citizens to attend and participate in local government 
meetings in order to receive a favorable ruling.294 In an Eleventh 
Circuit case considering legislative prayer, the court noted: 
It is fundamentally illogical for our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to forbid cadets from hearing grace before a meal 
at VMI, yet require members of the public who attend zoning 
meetings in Cobb County, Georgia, to hear a prayer asking for 
guidance — from a deity which may not be their own — on the 
decision over a parking lot variance.295 
                                                                                                     
over “zoning petitions, permit applications, and contract awards,” and an 
unfavorable decision by the Board on these sorts of decisions could have serious 
economic impacts on the petitioner).  
 292. See FRANK M. BRYAN, REAL DEMOCRACY: THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN 
MEETING AND HOW IT WORKS 93 (2004) (demonstrating the ways in which the 
physical setting of local government meetings creates an intimate environment 
between lawmakers and attendees); see also Roberts, supra note 22, at 425 (“The 
direct interaction between citizens and government officials in the town meeting 
context creates a greater risk of infringing on individuals’ First Amendment 
rights and a greater risk of conveying the impression that the government prefers 
certain religious views over others.”). 
 293. See Joseph Zelasko, The Reverse-Commandeering System: A Better Way 
to Distribute State and Local Authority, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 83, 107–10 (2017) 
(discussing the benefits of local governance, particularly as a means to address 
local issues). 
 294. See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 547 F.3d 1263, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(contrasting the atmosphere of a state legislature with the quasi-adjudicative role 
of a local county commission, “deciding whether to terminate an employee, 
suspend a liquor license, or grant a zoning variance”). 
 295. Id. The Eleventh Circuit was referring to Mellen v. Bunting, a Fourth 
Circuit case that determined that the Establishment Clause precluded school 
officials at the Virginia Military Institute, a state-operated military college, from 
sponsoring an official prayer before supper each day. See 327 F.3d 355, 371–72 
(4th Cir. 2003) (“Because of VMI’s coercive atmosphere, the Establishment Clause 
GOD SAVE THE UNITED STATES 447 
A willingness, or lack thereof, to participate in prayer should 
not be a barrier to actively participating in local government.296 
The concept of ceremonial deism may also highlight the 
importance of considering the local government setting. 
Ceremonial deism is defined as “a longstanding religious 
practice — sometimes extending back to the nation’s 
founding — with de minimis and nonsectarian religious content.”297 
Ceremonial deism has been used to justify religious government 
symbols or activities, such as the national motto (“In God We 
Trust”) and the opening of each Supreme Court session with the 
statement, “God save the United States and this honorable 
Court.”298 At the local government level, it is harder to argue for 
the innocuousness of ceremonial deism where citizens are being 
personally confronted with personal invocations of faith.299 The 
local government setting presents a different environment for 
prayer than is seen in state or federal government, and while there 
are benefits of civic participation at this level, the negative impact 
of legislator-led prayer are exacerbated.300  
                                                                                                     
precludes school officials from sponsoring an official prayer, even for mature 
adults.”). 
 296. See Hudson v. Pittsylvania County, 107 F. Supp. 3d 524, 535 (W.D. Va. 
2015) (“When Plaintiffs wish to advocate for local issues in front of the Board, 
they should not be faced with the choice between staying seated and unobservant, 
or acquiescing to the prayer practice of the Board, as joined by most, if not all, of 
the remaining public in attendance.”). 
 297. See Corbin, supra note 58, at 1546 (“Any reasonable person, the 
argument continues, would recognize that the state is not endorsing one version 
of religious truth or favoring one religion over others.”).  
 298. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (invoking the “history, character, and context” of such 
religious references as a basis for constitutionality), abrogated on other grounds 
by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014); see 
also supra note 3 (contextualizing the use of this invocation by the Supreme 
Court). 
 299. See, e.g., Lund v. Rowan County, No. 1:13CV207, 2013 WL 12137142, at 
*2–3 (M.D.N.C. July 23, 2013) (illustrating the personal nature of the prayer 
practice through thirteen different examples of prayers given by the Rowan 
County Board of Commissioners), rev’d and remanded, 837 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 
2016), as amended (Sept. 21, 2016), on reh’g en banc, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 300. Ceremonial deism has also been criticized for favoring religion over 
non-religion, by telling “atheists that their beliefs don’t count and aren’t worthy 
of being expressed at governmental occasions.” See Segall, supra note 96, at 730 
(contending that ceremonial deism also requires judges to “parse” the contents of 
prayers to assess if they are referring to a generic or specific god). 
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This factor, while not outcome-determinative, should be 
considered by courts confronted with legislative prayer 
challenges.301 It can reveal a value of intimacy or smallness, 
depending on the nature of its interaction with other factors.302 
Courts must assess whether the local government setting of the 
prayers is being used to create direct community between the 
government and citizens, or if it is being used to intimidate 
audience members into participation.303 
V. Conclusion 
Throughout the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, there has been significant confusion and an overall 
lack of clarity.304 Nowhere is this struggle more evident than in the 
legislative prayer context.305 Although the Supreme Court has 
seemingly created an exception for legislative prayer,306 the 
Court’s insistence on a fact-sensitive inquiry has left lower courts 
struggling to define the line of what constitutes impermissible 
legislative prayer.307 While Marsh and Town of Greece both provide 
clear examples of permissible legislative prayer practices, the 
Court has yet to define a clear boundary for lower courts to operate 
within.308 However, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo once wrote, 
                                                                                                     
 301. See supra notes 160–161 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth 
Circuit’s holistic consideration of the four factors).  
 302. See Richard Thompson Ford, Bourgeois Communities: A Review of 
Gerald Frug’s City Making, 56 STAN. L. REV. 231, 234 (2003) (observing the “civic 
virtues of relative intimacy, opportunities for meaningful citizen participation, 
and proximity to specific local concerns” at the local government level). 
 303. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 589 (2014) (clarifying that 
legislative prayer may not be “a means to coerce or intimidate others”). 
 304. See supra Part II.A (reviewing the history of Establishment Clause 
interpretation). 
 305. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s prior legislative 
prayer jurisprudence).  
 306. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575 (“Marsh is sometimes described as 
‘carving out an exception’ to the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
because it sustained legislative prayer without subjecting the practice to ‘any of 
the formal “tests” that have traditionally structured’ this inquiry.” (quoting 
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 796, 813 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
 307. See supra notes 129–138 (outlining the disharmony between the two 
circuit court decisions). 
 308. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577 (“A test that would sweep away what 
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courts should operate “with insight into social values, and with 
suppleness of adaptation to changing social needs.”309 Even given 
the lack of a doctrinal test, the Supreme Court has set forth values 
surrounding legislative prayer to guide analysis of 
constitutionality.310 In Marsh v. Chambers the Court expressed a 
societal value in honoring tradition.311 In Town of Greece v. 
Galloway the Court stressed the inclusivity of each prayer 
practice.312 The Court’s articulation of these values reflects the 
broader Establishment Clause jurisprudence and should not be 
dismissed by lower courts just because there is no clear legislative 
prayer test.313  
In attempting to navigate the grey area of constitutionality, 
the Fourth Circuit has devised a four-factor test to aid in judging 
when a prayer practice has gone beyond what has been sanctioned 
by the Court.314 In many ways these factors reflect the values set 
forth by the Supreme Court and can inform courts’ determinations 
of constitutionality, depending on the findings of the fact-sensitive 
inquiry.315 For example, by considering the commissioners as the 
sole prayer-givers, a court is not only deciding whether or not the 
                                                                                                     
has so long been settled would create new controversy and begin anew the very 
divisions along religious lines that the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent.”). 
 309. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 58 (2010) 
(observing that the judiciary should find “its chief worth in making vocal and 
audible the ideals that might otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity of 
life and expression, in guiding and directing choice within the limits where choice 
ranges”). 
 310. See Recent Case, supra note 128, at 629–30 (discussing the 
Establishment Clause values at play in post-Town of Greece legislative prayer 
cases). 
 311. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (“In light of the 
unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt 
that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of 
the fabric of our society.”). 
 312. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 584–85 (praising the town for its 
nondiscriminatory prayer practice). 
 313. See Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious 
Expression in Governmental Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 
110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 318–22 (2007) (identifying seven key values underlying 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, including inclusivity and tradition). 
 314. See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text (laying out the Fourth 
Circuit’s proposed factors). 
 315. See supra notes 114–123 and accompanying text (summarizing Town of 
Greece’s requirement of a fact-sensitive inquiry). 
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commissioners may be the only ones to offer prayers, but rather 
the court is contemplating whether the board is impermissibly 
concentrating government control of a religious message in 
themselves.316 And because there are likely legitimate 
justifications for legislator-led prayer,317 the fact-sensitive inquiry 
is of the utmost importance to delineate between a constitutional 
practice and an unconstitutional one.318 Furthermore, these 
considerations highlight the need to consider the factors in 
conjunction with one another.319 The commissioners as sole 
prayer-givers may not be fatal if the lawmakers are gathering in a 
corner to pray for themselves before a meeting, but when combined 
with directives to the audience to stand and participate in the 
prayers and the other factors, it can be deadly.320 
The Fourth Circuit test correctly determined that the practice 
at issue in Lund, and by extension in Bormuth, is not faithful to 
the Supreme Court’s values of tradition and multiplicity in 
legislative prayer.321 These practices are used to force religion 
through control and conformity, rather than using religion to 
                                                                                                     
 316. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992) (stressing the 
government’s complete control over the graduation prayers as evidence of an 
Establishment Clause violation). 
 317. For example, an amicus brief for Bormuth v. County of Jackson raised a 
concern the administrative costs and burden of arranging for volunteer clergy to 
pray before each meeting. Brief of Amici Curiae State of Michigan & Twenty-One 
Other States in Support of Jackson County & Affirmance at 10, Bormuth v. 
County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1869), 2017 WL 1710341, 
at *10.  
 318. See Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 285–87 (2014) (highlighting the importance of 
the fact-sensitive inquiry, particularly at the local government level). 
 319. See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text (detailing the Fourth 
Circuit’s rationale for a holistic factual review). 
 320. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Americans United, supra note 276, at 11–13 
(emphasizing that the only meetings at which the Board did not pray were the 
meetings where no audience members were in attendance was evidence of an 
intent to proselytize). 
 321. See Recent Case, supra note 128, at 632 (“With no guidance on how to 
review Rowan County’s prayer practice, the Fourth Circuit conducted an analysis 
based on a collection of principles and values it drew from across establishment 
jurisprudence.”); see also id. (listing the Fourth Circuit’s values as “nonpreference 
for any religion, the prohibition on the government composing prayers, 
accommodation of religion, noncoercion, avoiding ‘political division along religious 
lines,’ protecting religious minorities, and encouraging ecumenical prayer that is 
welcoming to all” (internal citations omitted)). 
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remind the lawmakers of the ideals of democracy.322 The Sixth 
Circuit’s rejection of this test shines a light on the need for further 
guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, particularly in 
cases concerning legislator-led prayer.323 The Supreme Court 
recently denied petitions for certiorari324 and rehearing325 for both 
Lund326 and Bormuth,327 signaling that there is no relief in sight 
for lower courts grappling with these cases.328 Justice Thomas, 
                                                                                                     
 322. See Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 283 
(4th Cir. 2005) (“[O]urs is a diverse nation not only in matters of secular viewpoint 
but also in matters of religious adherence. Advancing one specific creed at the 
outset of each public meeting runs counter to the credo of American pluralism and 
discourages the diverse views on which our democracy depends.”). 
 323. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Rowan County v. Lund, No. 
17-565 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2017) (“Only [the Supreme] Court can resolve the intractable 
conflict between two en banc courts of appeals and provide state and local officials 
with much-needed guidance on this important, frequently recurring 
Establishment Clause question.”). 
 324. See id. at 1 (filing Rowan County’s petition for certiorari on October 12, 
2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, No. 
17-7220 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2017) (filing Peter Bormuth’s petition for certiorari on 
December 21, 2017). 
 325. See Petition for Rehearing at 1, Rowan County v. Lund, No. 17-565 (U.S. 
July 23, 2018), 2018 WL 3584721 (“Petitioner Rowan County understands that 
this Court grants Rule 44.2 rehearing petitions exceedingly rarely. But this 
petition presents one of those very rare situations.”); Corrected Petition for 
Rehearing at 1, Bormuth v. County of Jackson, No. 17-7220 (U.S. July 23, 2018) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court should grant rehearing under Supreme Court 
Rule 44.2). 
 326. See Rowan County v. Lund, 138 S. Ct. 2564, 2564 (2018) (denying Rowan 
County’s petition for certiorari); Rowan County v. Lund, No. 17-565, 2018 WL 
4037498, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2018) (denying Rowan County’s petition for 
rehearing). 
327. See Bormuth v. Jackson County, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (denying Peter 
Bormuth’s petition for certiorari), reh’g denied, No. 17-7220, 2018 WL 4037507 
(U.S. Aug. 24, 2018); Bormuth v. Jackson County, No. 17-7220, 2018 WL 4037507, 
at *1 (U.S. Aug. 24, 2018) (denying Peter Bormuth’s petition for rehearing). 
 328. See Robert W. T. Tucci, A Moral Minefield: Resolving the Dispute Over 
Legislator-Led Invocations, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 601, 602–04 (2018) (“[E]ven 
if the Supreme Court did not take the opportunity presented by the petition for 
certiorari filed in Lund v. Rowan County, it should nevertheless quickly resolve 
the moral minefield created by the existing circuit split.”). Interestingly, the 
Supreme Court took its time before denying both petitions for certiorari, 
rescheduling Conference on Lund fifteen times and Bormuth thirteen times. 
Rowan County, North Carolina v. Lund, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/rowan-county-north-carolina-v-lund/ 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Bormuth v. Jackson County, Michigan, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus 
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joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented from the denial of certiorari 
for Lund, arguing that “[t]his Court should have stepped in to 
resolve this conflict.”329 But until the Supreme Court provides more 
clarity, the Fourth Circuit’s test provides a useful tool for other 
courts to assesses legislative prayer. 
                                                                                                     
blog.com/case-files/cases/bormuth-v-jackson-county-michigan/ (last visited Jan. 
22, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 329. See Rowan, 138 S. Ct. at 2567 (“[T]he Sixth and Fourth Circuits are now 
split on the legality of legislator-led prayer. States and local lawmakers can lead 
prayers in Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan, but not in South Carolina, 
North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, or West Virginia.”). 
